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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal from a 
final Order of the Industrial Commission (the "Commission") 
pursuant to Sections 35-1-82.53, 35-1-86, 63-46b-16 and 78-2a-3 
of the Utah Code Ann. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The following issues are presented for review: 
(1) Is there substantial evidence to support the 
Commission's finding that Petitioner failed to establish, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, medical causation between his 
industrial accident on May 21, 1976 and his now claimed permanent 
total disability? 
(2) Did the Commission err in not applying the "odd lot 
doctrine" to Petitioner's claim because it found no medical 
causation? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW OF FINDING NO MEDICAL 
CAUSATION. 
Because these proceedings commenced after January 1, 1988, 
the review by this Court is governed by the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (UAPA) .x 
The Commission determined that Petitioner Gerald Hansen 
("Petitioner") failed to prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that his May 21, 1976 industrial injury medically 
Sections 63-46b-l e£ seq. of the Utah Code Annotated. 
caused his now claimed permanent total disability.2 This Court 
has consistently held that " . . . medical causation is an issue 
of fact . . ."3 In reviewing a factual finding, this Court will 
disturb it only if it is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before the Court.4 
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.5 
Petitioner necessarily has the burden of marshalling all of 
the evidence showing that, despite the facts, and in light of the 
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the Commission's findings 
are not supported by substantial evidence.6 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW OF FINDING THAT THE "ODD 
LOT DOCTRINE" DOES NOT APPLY. 
Since the interpretation of the "odd lot doctrine", and its 
applicability to Petitioner's claim, is a question of law, this 
2R. at 260-263. The decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge dated March 3, 1993 is attached as Appendix "A". The 
Commission's decision dated May 13, 1994 is attached as Appendix 
"B" . 
3Chase v. Industrial Commission, 872 P.2d 475 (Utah App. 
1994) . 
Commercial Carriers and Old Republic Insurance v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 255 Utah Adv. Rep. 57 (Utah App. 
1994) ; a copy of Commercial Carriers and Old Republic Insurance 
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, supra, is attached as Appendix 
"C" . 
5Chase v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
6King v. Industrial Commission, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah App. 
1993) . 
2 
Court's review is under a correction of error standard, giving no 
deference t : • t:l 1 s Coi i: tin :i ssi on* s deed si on.7 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
This case does not ii 1 v ol v e the interpretation of a statute, 
ordinance, rul^ or regulation. Rather, the issue presented on 
appeal per th,, med i cal 
causation. The tci^ owing scauutes and .: u J eb are , howt..
 v^r, 
controlling : * *\\\s case: 
1 . fc-r-" .. .a u a c ^ ' ! 
2 . Sect ion 3'-. - J. - 6^, r ; _ ah Code Anr: 9 
3. Section 6o-46h-- :>". of Utah Code Ann.10 
On May ,;. ' Petitioner, while employed by Salt Lake 
C:i t] /' C o r p o r a "" ' : "• ""- •* '~: ,*^ 1. -"-i • ' • a c r a t e o f g l a s s 
when the c 
lower extremity A' ;:er undergoing surgery :or repair :-* the 
•• * r'" and left knee, 
Pet.tionei leturned i. woir, . . , • . ...... ., anuary 7. 
On February 4. ';-".' • etit ioner war a; ^;;r^ carrying 
wry 
causing .r . ; ro La..,. ; .,• i. he g;. ou; 
7King v. Industrial Commission, supra, at 12 85 
8Appendix :iu- attached. 
9Appendix "r^ attached. 
l(JAppendix r attached. 
3 
Petitioner never returned to work for the City. 
Petitioner cannot recall why he discontinued working for the 
City and what efforts he made or could have made to continue 
working in 1977. Interestingly, on May 24, 1977, the orthopedic 
surgeon, who performed Petitioner's ankle and knee surgery, wrote 
a letter to the City stating that Petitioner could return to 
light duty work operating a motor vehicle. 
On June 17, 1977, Petitioner filed a claim for worker's 
compensation benefits with the Commission. A hearing was held 
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on September 19, 1977. 
The ALJ referred the matter to a medical panel. The medical 
panel report issued on March 21, 1978 stated that Petitioner had 
a total impairment related to his industrial accident of 16% 
whole person. Petitioner did not, however, at any time during 
the 1978 proceeding, claim permanent total disability. 
In 1982, Petitioner filed a second Application for Hearing 
with the Commission. The matter was again referred to a medical 
panel which rated Petitioner's physical impairment related to the 
1976 accident at 14% whole person. The Commission denied 
permanent partial impairment benefits to Petitioner because the 
14% rating was less than the 16% rating he received and was 
compensated for in 1977. The 1982 medical panel also found that 
Petitioner had pulmonary (respiratory) problems due to a tumor 
which was unrelated causally to the industrial accident on May 
21, 1976. At no time during the 1982 proceeding before the 
Commission did Petitioner claim permanent total disability. 
4 
In late 1991, fifteen years after the 1976 industrial 
c ' > 4~ "~* : tionei tiled a ~"~-:«1 4~-r -err^nent * eta] disability 
\ . : :,. Commission The ma..-i- --. dicai 
panel . medical panel found tnat Pet it liner hac a _ . ^  whole 
}• i. - ' ited LU — ' *"i"- - -Ht-<— K^ai -^ "-'ident The 
medical pane.. * * .terminer L,.JI ..... 
person impairment r-dated : :.:. - -•^ •^•onary •;respiratory) 
cond i t:l on ; \ ] " *.:•'*. "x— -. nd*.:str ia'l a c c i d e n t . 
T h e ALi. :.eiying pix.nu.., . ^ .r. „•:' .~. _ .-i.. c y 
Admin 1st rat ion ' c-- determination that: Petit i crier was permanently 
disal - ., 1976 caused 
his permanent -~oLa_ uisabi . ity. 
On Motion fo? Review, J:he ommissL- \ ri'jorporated the ALJ ' s 
1 i. nd
 : *' "i ' .ea 
to demonstrate .-• preponderance ei ; - --v ;deuce
 f triat n_is 
industri^" "" :ry - ^a^ ?i, 1^7u causeu : _:cw claimed 
permane.... . .- . 
Petitioner f:i d an appeal with this Court seeking a 
reversal of the Commissi"nf° determ^natinu. 
The following Is a statement ox i.n*- riots relevant to the 
Commission * s dec isi on: 
1. " -i i ta\ :.i y 
as -. maintenance mai and qjazie: :IC-J iing .; ra.c ui g.ctss 
v -..-- • • crate tipped over and fell on him injuring his lower 
5 
right extremity.11 
2. Petitioner was 47 years old on the date of the 
industrial accident.12 
3. Petitioner had surgery on his right ankle on May 21, 
1976.13 
4. On September 8, 1976, Petitioner had left knee surgery 
which was determined to be related to the 1976 industrial 
accident.14 
5. In mid-January 1977, Petitioner returned to work with 
the City performing his normal work duties.15 
6. On or about February 4, 1977, Petitioner, while at work 
for the City, was carrying a bundle of chainlink fencing when his 
left knee and right foot gave way causing him to fall to the 
ground.16 
7. It is not clear whether or not Petitioner actually 
caused any aggravation to his left knee on February 4, 1977 but 
he did not return to work after that incident.17 
8. Petitioner did not recall why he discontinued working 
HR. at 173. 
12R. at 173. 
13R. at 173. 
14R. at 173. 
15R. at 173. 
16R. at 173. 
17R. at 174. 
6 
for the City and what efforts he made or could have made to 
c 01 ltd i n le work: ng in 1977 .18 
9. There : °? ^ ^ information RR to 1 3ther Petitioner was 
susceptible t^ rehar iJ itat; or. ;:, l1)' ' 
10. L±L±unex-a orthopedic surcreon who 
performed nis aLM« .-»..u ;wi^^ surgeries, advised ;..... t-Ly a::d 
Petitioner- ir writing, that Petitioner could return to light 
20 
11. Petitioner never returned to work after February 4, 
1977.21 
1 2 . ; . - ; : • . • • •  L 
Security disab : . <: > ;>ener. 1 L S . -'-
13. On J-ir^  • - P^t i ti r-r^ -r f i. led an Application for 
worker's compe::;^. .. • ; >*.; •  . . •. 3 
14. fic\:\ . -.;rie of 197!? thrcuj- "=ay or 1978, Petitioner 
receJ ved no treatment for eithei hrr- '\ <-+ * "• -•-•- •••>•• "^ -;s righr 
ankle, He did, however, receive meu. •_ ,24 
15. A hearing was held before an A:,J r September 
18R. at 191. 
!9R. at 192. 
20R. at 174, x^l, 192. 
21R. at 1 74, 
22R. at 174. 
23R. at 174, 175. 
24R. at 174. 
7 
1977.25 
16. The matter was referred to a medical panel. The 
medical panel report, issued on March 21, 1978, recommended an 
impairment rating for Petitioner's right foot and left knee at 
16% whole person.26 
17. On May 10, 1978, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order awarding Petitioner temporary total 
compensation and permanent partial impairment benefits based on 
the 16% whole person rating. There was no claim or award for 
permanent total disability.27 
18. On September 29, 1977, the Social Security 
Administration denied Petitioner's claim for disability benefits 
stating that Petitioner was capable of doing light duty work.28 
19. On October 31, 1977, Petitioner filed a request for 
reconsideration with the Social Security Administration.29 
20. On December 13, 1977, the Social Security 
Administration again denied disability benefits to Petitioner.30 
21. On January 27, 1978, Petitioner filed a request for 
'R. at 175. 
'R. at 175. 
rR. at 175. 
;R. at 175, 176. 
*R. at 175, 176. 
>R. at 175, 176. 
8 
hearing on Uie denial of his Social Security benefits.31 
22. ( y/b, after a hearina rhe Social Security 
Administ r a i L c i i u^arded permanent .,_...L. 3 
Petitioner retroactive r- '"ay *.", :-'/•:. 
23. ' Aua;:--r " TO-.. -o«-;-^.-or 
received utaii'rj:. ui J ^ i* ...eaicai pi^. ../.:_- ..it 
ankle pain, back pain, left knee pain, right elbow pain and neck 
pad 1 :i 33 
24. On November 12, 1979, Petitioner underwent a second 
knee surgery. 
25. 
26. Lis l^ h*', -* aiionei tiled anoLhei cippLKaLiun wj.ih the 
Commission r° rues Ling additional worker's ^onipensaLicii 
benefits.34: 
27. Petitionee, in his second application, did not claim 
permanent t otc ": -.sabiiil - * * 
2 B . '" I "he AL J a ga in L^IL-II... . 
which rated Petitioner's ! . f:an?nei;r relate . ' :::.- .9 '6 
IIHIIIMLI: i a 1 <;M *I * I (IP.JII at 14% wnoxe person which was less than the 
31R. at 175, 176. 
32R. at 1 76, 
33R. at 176. 
34R. at 177, 
35R. at 177. 
9 
16% rating by the medical panel in 1977.36 
29. The ALJ ruled that Petitioner was not entitled to any 
additional benefits, other than temporary total compensation, 
since his 1982 permanent partial impairment rating due to his 
1976 industrial accident was less than the rating given to him in 
1977.37 
30. The 1982 medical panel also found that Petitioner had 
pulmonary (respiratory) problems that were due to a tumor which 
may have been present as early as the date of the 1976 industrial 
injury but was unrelated causally to the industrial accident.38 
31. From October 1980 through March of 1982, Petitioner was 
seeking care at the VA Hospital for pulmonary related problems.39 
32. At the time, Petitioner was a 40-50 pack per year 
smoker.40 
33. In November 1982, a medical report was issued 
indicating that Petitioner had increased arthritis in his foot 
joints.41 
34. In December 1982, a medical report stated that 
Petitioner's complaints were out of proportion to the examination 
36R. at 177. 
37R. at 177. 
38R. at 185. 
39R. at 184. 
40R. at 184. 
41R. at 177. 
10 
findings .42 
35. On January 11, 1983, Petitioner's Social Security 
benefits were discontinued because it was determined that 
Petitioner could do other work.43 
36. On March 7, 1983, Petitioner filed a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Social Security Administration and on 
October 26, 1983, his Social Security benefits were reinstated.44 
37. From 1981 through the present, Petitioner received 
continual care from the VA Hospital for chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease.45 
38. In late 1991, Petitioner filed a claim for permanent 
total disability.46 
39. After a hearing, the ALJ referred the Petitioner's 
claim to a medical panel.47 
40. The medical panel found that Petitioner had the 
following whole person impairments: 
a. 17% for the right ankle and the left knee which is 
attributable to the 1976 accident; 
b. 2% for the left ankle, 10% for the low back and 1% 
42R. at 177. 
43R. at 177. 
44R. at 178. 
45R. at 178 and 185, 186. 
46R. at 191. 
47R. at 171. 
11 
for the macular degeneration all of which are not 
attributable to the 1976 accident; and 
c. 40% for the pulmonary (respiratory) condition 
which is not attributable to the 1976 accident.48 
39. On March 18, 1993, the ALJ issued her Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order stating the following: 
a. The 4 0% whole person rating that the medical panel 
assessed for Petitioner's (pulmonary) respiratory condition 
makes it clear that the condition is the most significant 
impairment that Petitioner has currently.49 
b. Due to the significant time delay between the 
Petitioner's discontinuance of work and his filing of the 
permanent total disability claim, information regarding what 
was happening in 1977 for the Petitioner is very "sparse".50 
c. Petitioner recalls very little about why he 
discontinued working and what efforts he made, or could have 
made, to continue working in 1977.51 
d. The ALJ does not feel she has very accurate 
information on which to make a determination as to what 
caused the Petitioner to discontinue working in 1977.52 
48R. at 188. 
49R. at 190. 
50R. at 191. 
51R. at 191. 
52R. at 192. 
12 
e. Due to the significant time delay between the 
Petitioner's discontinuance of work with the City and his 
filing of a permanent total disability claim, the City and 
the Division of Rehabilitation need not offer rehabilitation 
in 1991 because Petitioner has developed a post-injury 
significant pulmonary (respiratory) condition, is now nearly 
retirement age and has not worked for the past sixteen years 
(1977 to 1993) .53 
f. There is indication in the medical records that 
the Petitioner might have been able to perform some kind of 
work in 1977, notwithstanding the knee and ankle 
impairments.54 
g. In 1977, the Petitioner might have been able to 
return to some kind of work had he sought or been offered 
some minimal new training.55 
h. There is a lack of evidence, due to the delay in 
filing the permanent total disability claim, as to whether 
Petitioner was susceptible to rehabilitation.56 
i. Based primarily on the Social Security disability 
records, the ALJ determines that the Petitioner has been 
disabled since the date of his 1976 industrial injury to the 
53R. at 191. The decision of ALJ was issued in 1993. 
54R. at 191, 192. 
55R. at 192. 
56R. at 192. 
13 
present.57 
j. The ALJ finds that the primary cause of the 
Petitioner's permanent total disability during the past 
sixteen years has been the left knee and right ankle 
impairments sustained in the May 21, 1976 industrial 
accident .58 
40. On May 13, 1994, the Commission issued an Order denying 
Petitioner's claim for permanent total disability stating the 
following: 
a. The Commission adopts the Findings of Fact set 
forth in the ALJ's decision.59 
b. The Commission does not know: (1) the underlying 
facts upon which the Social Security Administration made its 
award; (2) whether those facts are supported by the 
evidence; and (3) whether it applied the appropriate legal 
principles required by the Utah Worker's Compensation laws 
in making its determination. The Commission, therefore, 
does not place its primary reliance on the Social Security 
determination. 
c. In 1977, Petitioner received a 16% permanent 
partial impairment rating for his industrial injuries 
sustained in a 1976 accident. The 16% impairment rating 
R. at 192. 
;R. at 193. 
>R. at 260. 
14 
attributable to his 1976 industrial accident remained 
virtually unchanged in sixteen years although his physical 
impairment due to non-industrial conditions, such as his 
pulmonary (respiratory) problems, increased.60 
d. Petitioner did not actually return to work with 
the City after 1977. His failure, however, to return to 
work may be attributable to reasons other than his injury 
and is, therefore, given little weight.61 
e. Petitioner's treating physician released him to 
return to light duty work in 1977.62 
f. Petitioner filed two separate claims for worker's 
compensation benefits within a few years of the 1976 
accident, but at no time during the proceedings before the 
Commission did he claim to be permanently totally 
disabled.63 
g. Shortly after his 1976 accident, Petitioner began 
suffering pulmonary (respiratory) and other assorted medical 
problems, which had been appraised by a medical panel as 
much more significant and debilitating than his industrial 
injury.64 
60R. at 261. 
61R. at 261. 
62R. at 261. 
63R. at 261. 
64R. at 261. 
15 
41. In view of the record before it, the Commission ruled 
that Petitioner had failed to prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that his 1976 industrial injury medically caused his 
now claimed permanent total disability.65 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The City argues that the Commission correctly determined 
that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating 
medical causation between an accident on May 21, 1976 and his now 
claimed permanent total disability. There is substantial 
evidence in the record to support the Commission's determination, 
including the following: 
1. There is no evidence to indicate why Petitioner 
discontinued his employment with the City in 1977. A medical 
report prepared by Petitioner's physician in 1977 stated that he 
could do light duty work. 
2. Petitioner filed claims for worker's compensation 
benefits in 1977 and 1982. In both proceedings, he at no time, 
claimed permanent total disability. 
3. The permanent partial disability attributable to 
Petitioner's industrial accident in 1976 remained virtually 
unchanged for the fifteen years prior to Petitioner's application 
for permanent total disability. 
4. Petitioner's subsequent pulmonary (respiratory) 
condition, which is not attributable to the industrial accident, 
"R. at 261. 
16 
caused Petitioner's permanent total disability. 
5. The ALJ should not have relied primarily on the Social 
Security Administration determination regarding Petitioner's 
permanent total disability. 
Further, the City argues that the "odd lot doctrine" does 
not apply because the Commission properly found no medical 
causation between Petitioner's 1976 industrial injury and his now 
claimed permanent total disability. 
Finally, the City argues that it is the Commission, not the 
ALJ, who is the ultimate fact finder. The Commission's findings 
are of sufficient detail that this Court can discern its logical 
process in finding no medical causation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED 
TO PROVE, BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE# 
MEDICAL CAUSATION BETWEEN HIS INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT ON MAY 21, 1976 AND HIS 1991 CLAIMED 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY. 
A. MEDICAL CAUSATION IS A FACTUAL MATTER. 
Petitioner argues that the Commission erred in finding that 
he failed to meet his burden of demonstrating medical causation 
between an accident on May 21, 1976 and his now claimed permanent 
total disability. 
This Court has consistently held that "medical causation is 
a 'factual matter1".66 Petitioner has the burden to prove 
66Chase v. Influstrifll Cpmrniggion, guprfl at 479. 
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medical causation by a preponderance of the evidence.67 This 
Court reviews the Commission's factual findings under the 
substantial evidence standard.68 
Substantial evidence is such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.69 
B. THE COMMISSION'S FINDING OF NO MEDICAL 
CAUSATION IS SUPPORTED BY RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
AS A REASONABLE MIND MIGHT ACCEPT AS ADEQUATE 
TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION. 
In reviewing the whole record, there is substantial evidence 
to support the Commission's finding that Petitioner failed to 
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his 1976 
industrial accident was the medical cause of his now claimed 
total permanent disability. 
The industrial accident which Petitioner claims caused his 
permanent disability occurred on May 21, 1976. The injuries he 
sustained from the May 21, 1976 industrial accident were to his 
right ankle and left knee.70 
Petitioner left the employment of the City in 1977. There 
is no evidence, however, which indicates why Petitioner 
discontinued his employment with the City.71 The Petitioner did 
67Large v. Industrial Commission. 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
68Chase v. Industrial Commission, supr^ at 479. 
69
 Id. 
70Fact H i , 3, 4. 
71Fact 18. 
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not recall why he left and what efforts he made, or could have 
made to continue working in 1977. Petitioner's treating 
physician, however, stated in 1977, that Petitioner could still 
do light duty work.72 
The ALJ attributes the lack of evidence to the fifteen year 
time delay between the industrial accident and Petitioner's 
filing of his claim for permanent total disability. This Court, 
however, stated in Zupon v. Industrial Commission,73 that in 
order for a claimant to receive benefits, he or she must first 
" . . . prove that he or she can no longer perform the duties 
required in his or her occupation. . . . " and that he or she 
cannot be rehabilitated. After the employee has shown that 
rehabilitation is not possible, the employer has the opportunity 
to prove the existence of steady work the employee can perform. 
The time delay of fifteen years does not change Petitioner's 
burden as stated in Zupon.74 to prove he could no longer work in 
1977 and he could not be rehabilitated. The lack of evidence 
supports the Commission's finding. 
In 1977, the Petitioner filed a claim for worker's 
compensation benefits.75 The 1977 claim was referred to a 
72Fact 110. 
73Zupon v. Industrial Commission. 860 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah 
App. 1993). A copy of Zupon v. Industrial Commission, supra is 
attached as Appendix "C". 
74Zupon v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
75Fact 113. 
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medical panel which found that Petitioner had a permanent partial 
impairment of 16% attributable to his industrial injury.76 There 
was no mention by the medical panel or the Petitioner that he was 
permanently totally disabled.77 In 1982, Petitioner filed 
another claim for benefits with the Commission.78 The 1982 
matter was also referred to a medical panel. The 1982 medical 
panel found that Petitioner's impairment related to his 
industrial injury was 14% which was less than the finding of the 
medical panel in 1977. Accordingly, Petitioner was not awarded 
any benefits in 1982 for permanent partial impairment.79 Again, 
Petitioner never asserted that he was permanently totally 
disabled and the 1982 medical panel made no mention of such 
condition. The 1982 medical panel did, however, find that 
Petitioner had pulmonary (respiratory) problems unrelated to his 
1976 industrial accident. 
In 1991, fifteen years after the industrial accident, 
Petitioner, for the first time, asserts that he is permanently 
totally disabled. The 1991 claim was referred to a medical 
panel. The 1991 medical panel found that Petitioner had total 
physical impairment of 70% of the whole person. The medical 
panel, however, determined that only 17% of the total physical 
•Fact fl6. 
'Fact Ul7. 
'Fact 126. 
'Facts 1(29. 
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impairment was related to the 1976 industrial accident. The 
medical panel attributed 40% of the Petitioner's disability to 
his pulmonary (respiratory) problems which were unrelated to his 
1976 industrial accident.80 
Accordingly, Petitioner's impairment related to his 1976 
industrial accident remained essentially unchanged throughout the 
sixteen years prior to his claim for permanent total disability. 
He received a 16% permanent partial rating in 1977, a 14% rating 
in 1982 and a 17% rating in 1992. Consequently, even though 
Petitioner's total physical impairment increased from 16% in 1977 
to 70% in 1992, the impairment attributable to the 1976 
industrial accident remained virtually unchanged.81 The most 
significant impairment that Petitioner had in 1991 was his 
pulmonary (respiratory) problems.82 
Petitioner had opportunities during the sixteen years, in 
two different proceedings before the Commission, to claim 
permanent total disability and that he was unable to work after 
1977. He never mentioned permanent total disability until 1991. 
Petitioner's most disabling condition and the cause of his 
permanent total disability is his pulmonary (respiratory) 
impairment. The 1992 medical panel determined that of his 70% 
whole person disability, 40% is related to his pulmonary 
80Facts 14 0. 
81
 Id. 
82Id. 
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(respiratory) condition. The history regarding Petitioner's 
pulmonary (respiratory) condition began in 1976 when Petitioner 
was hospitalized for chest pain and a suspected pulmonary 
embolus.83 In 1980, Petitioner was seen at the VA Hospital for a 
six week cough. The VA Hospital records indicate that Petitioner 
was a 40 to 50 pack a year smoker.84 From October 1980 through 
November 1980, Petitioner was hospitalized at the VA Hospital for 
an abnormal mass seen on a chest x-ray.85 In 1981, Petitioner 
was seen at the VA Hospital for an upper respiratory tract 
infection.86 In 1981, Petitioner was provided care at the VA 
Hospital for post-surgical thoracic pain, chest wall pain and 
acute bronchitis. In the 1982 proceeding before the Commission, 
the medical panel found that Petitioner's pulmonary (respiratory) 
problems were due to a tumor which may have been present as early 
as 1976 but was unrelated causally to the 1976 industrial 
accident. In 1985, Petitioner was seen at the VA Hospital for 
upper respiratory tract infections with sharp pain. From 
December 1987 to January 1988, Petitioner received medical care 
at the VA Hospital for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and 
chronic bronchitis.87 In 1988, pulmonary function tests were 
83Fact 1|31. 
84Fact H32. 
85R. at 185. 
86R. at 185. 
87Facts 131. 
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done at the VA Hospital and it was determined that the Petitioner 
had moderate pulmonary obstruction.88 In 1989, Petitioner was 
seen at the VA Hospital for an increase in his chronic shortness 
of breath.89 In 1989, pulmonary function tests were done at the 
VA Hospital and it was again determined that Petitioner had 
moderate obstruction. From March 1989 through April 1989, 
Petitioner was inpatient at the VA Hospital due to chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease.90 In June 1989, Petitioner was 
seen at the VA Hospital due to acute exacerbations of his chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease. There is substantial evidence in 
the record showing that the cause of Petitioner's permanent total 
disability is his pulmonary (respiratory) problems and not the 
1976 industrial injury. 
Interestingly, the ALJ recognized that the pulmonary 
(respiratory) condition was the most significant impairment that 
the Petitioner has.91 The ALJ stated that rehabilitation was not 
a possibility because Petitioner had developed a significant 
post-injury respiratory condition.92 
The ALJ relied primarily on the Social Security 
Administration decision to support her conclusion that Petitioner 
*
8R. at 185. 
89ld. 
90
 Id. 
91Fact H39. 
92Id. 
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was permanently totally disabled as a result of the 1976 
industrial injury.93 The Social Security Administration, 
however, was not concerned about finding a causal connection 
between the 1976 industrial injury and permanent total disability 
or other legal standards applicable to worker's compensation 
benefits. The Social Security Administration decides only 
whether a person is permanently totally disabled. Further, the 
City was not a party to the Social Security Administration 
proceeding. To rely primarily on the Social Security 
Administration ruling deprives the City of its right to present 
its evidence, cross examine witnesses and otherwise contest the 
matter. There must be evidence other than the Social Security 
Administration decision to support a determination that the 1976 
industrial injury caused Petitioner's permanent total disability. 
The Commission, based upon the Findings of Fact of the ALJ, 
was obligated to correct the ALJ's misplacement of the burden of 
proof. The Commission, in applying the proper burden of proof, 
determined that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a causal 
connection between the 1976 industrial accident and his permanent 
total disability. There is substantial evidence to support the 
Commission's conclusion that Petitioner failed to show medical 
causation. 
Fact 1(3 9. 
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POINT II 
THE "ODD LOT" DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE 
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY FOUND NO MEDICAL 
CAUSATION BETWEEN PETITIONER'S 1976 
INDUSTRIAL INJURY AND HIS NOW CLAIMED 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY. 
Petitioner argues that he is entitled to permanent total 
disability benefits based on the "odd lot" doctrine. The "odd 
lot" doctrine allows the Commission to find permanent total 
disability when a relatively small percentage of impairment 
caused by an industrial accident is combined with other factors 
to render a claimant unable to obtain employment. 
This Court, however, has consistently held that for the odd 
lot doctrine to apply, there must first be medical causation 
between the claimant's industrial accident and the claimed 
permanent total disability.94 That is different from, and not 
controlled in any way by, a determination that the industrial 
accident caused a permanent partial disability.95 The standard 
of proof for medical causation is by a preponderance of the 
evidence.96 
The Commission found that Petitioner failed to prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that his 1976 industrial injury 
94Zupon v. Indugtrifrl gommigsipn, supra. 
95Id. at 963. 
96Large v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah 
App. 1988) . 
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medically caused his now claimed permanent total disability.97 
Therefore, the odd lot doctrine does not apply and need not be 
addressed by this Court.98 
In Zupon, this Court reviewed issues, and underlying facts, 
similar to those presented by Petitioner. Claimant Zupon 
sustained industrial injuries in 1976. In 1977, claimant Zupon 
received workers' compensation benefits for permanent partial 
impairment of 10%. In 1978, claimant Zupon was awarded 
disability benefits by the Social Security Administration. 
Subsequently, claimant Zupon had increased problems with his 
arthritic condition. 
The Commission concluded that claimant Zupon had failed to 
establish the necessary medical causation between his 1975 
industrial accident and his permanent total disability stating 
that his arthritic condition caused his permanent total 
disability. On appeal, claimant Zupon argued that he was 
entitled to permanent total disability benefits under the "odd 
lot doctrine". 
This Court, in Zupon, held that for the "odd lot doctrine" 
to apply, the claimant must first show that there is medical 
causation between his 1975 industrial accident and his now 
claimed permanent total disability. 
Fact 1(42. 
;Zupon v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
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This Court affirmed the Commission's determination stating 
that substantial evidence supports the conclusion that claimant 
Zupon did not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
medical causation between his 1975 industrial accident and his 
now claimed total permanent disability. 
Petitioner, like the claimant in Zupon. received partial 
impairment ratings attributable to the 1976 industrial accident 
years before a claim for permanent total disability was filed." 
Shortly after the industrial accident and thereafter, Petitioner, 
like claimant Zupon, had a significant impairment unrelated to 
the industrial accident. In 1992, the medical panel for the 
Commission found that 40% of Petitioner's disability was related 
to his pulmonary (respiratory) condition. Petitioner, like the 
claimant in Zupon, did receive Social Security benefits prior to 
his filing of an application for permanent total disability. The 
claimant in Zupon waited sixteen years to file his application 
for permanent total disability. Petitioner waited fifteen years 
to file his claim for permanent total disability. 
In Large v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 10° this Court 
held that: 
Under the medical cause test, the claimant 
must prove the disability is medically the 
result of an exertion or an injury that 
occurred during a work related activity. The 
standard of proof for causation is by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
"Facts HH17, 28-
100Lftrg5 v r I n d u s t r i a l Cpmrniggign pf Utah/ SUprg.. 
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This Court, in Large. found that the industrial injury, for 
which the claimant received a 5% permanent partial impairment 
rating, was not the medical cause of claimant's permanent total 
disability and that the claimant's age, obesity, lack of 
transferable skills and prior back surgery resulted in his 
disability. 
This Court concluded in Large that there was an inadequate 
causal link between the permanent total disability and the 
industrial inj ury. 
Accordingly, Petitioner's argument, based on the "odd lot 
doctrine," is not applicable and need not be addressed because 
the Commission found that Petitioner's industrial injury did not 
medically cause his permanent total disability. 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION IS THE ULTIMATE FACT FINDER. 
The Petitioner criticizes the Commission for reversing the 
ALJ. Petitioner argues that the ALJ prepared extensive Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions while the Commission incorporated the 
ALJ's Findings of Fact and articulated its reasons in a less 
exhaustive manner. 
In Commercial Carriers and Old Republic Insurance v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah,101 this Court reviewed a decision 
by the Commission to reverse the ALJ. It was argued in 
101Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Commission, 255 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 57 (Utah App.). (A copy of Commercial Carriers v. 
Industrial Commission. supra is attached as Appendix "C". 
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Commercial Carriers that the Commission could not reverse the 
ALJ's Findings of Fact without stating specifically and in detail 
the reasons for doing so. 
This Court held in Commercial Carriers that, while it is the 
ALJ who initially hears the evidence, the Commission is the 
ultimate fact finder.102 The decisions of the Commission, not the 
ALJ, are deemed conclusive. 
This Court further stated that the Commission's findings are 
of sufficient detail if this Court can discern the Commission's 
logical process, i.e. subsidiary fact findings logically to lead 
to ultimate fact findings. This Court concluded that: 
It is the province of the Board, not the 
appellate courts, to resolve conflicting 
evidence and where inconsistent inferences 
can be drawn from the same evidence, it is 
for the Board to draw the inferences.103 
Although the Commission incorporated the Findings of Fact of 
the ALJ, it was obligated to apply the appropriate burden on the 
Petitioner to establish a causal relationship between the 1976 
industrial accident and permanent total disability particularly 
since the evidence shows that there is no medical causation. The 
Commission was obligated to place the burden on Petitioner to 
show why he could no longer perform his duties with the City in 
1977. 
The Commission is the ultimate fact finder. The Commission 
102Id. citing Chase v. Industrial Commission, 872 P.2d 475, 
479 (Utah App. 1994). 
103I£. at 59. 
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gave specific reasons for its decision which are supported by the 
Findings of Fact. The Commission is not required to accept the 
ALJ's decision. On the contrary, if the ALJ has not applied the 
facts properly, the Commission must correct the error. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission, as the ultimate fact finder, properly found, 
based upon the Findings of Fact, that Petitioner failed to show, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the industrial accident 
on May 21, 1976 was the medical cause of Petitioner's permanent 
and total disability. There is substantial evidence to support 
the Commission's decision. The "odd lot doctrine", therefore, 
does not apply to this case. 
DATED this J_ day of /[/fafCL^ 1995. 
FRANK M. NAKAMUI 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Respondents 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 3 00 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 
14, 1992 at 1:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing was 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and was represented by 
Virginius Dabney, Attorney. 
The defendant, Salt Lake City Corporation (Self-
Insured), was represented by Ray Montgomery, 
Attorney. 
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by 
Erie Boorman, Attorney/Administrator. 
This case involves a claim for permanent total disability 
benefits related to a May 21, 1976 industrial accident resulting in 
injuries to the applicant7s right ankle and his left knee. At the 
time of the hearing, the self-insured employer and the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund argued that the applicant was not entitled to 
permanent total disability benefits because the applicant's 
disabling condition was his non-industrial pulmonary obstruction 
and not the orthopedic problems that resulted from the industrial 
accident. The Employers Reinsurance Fund pointed out that the 
applicant's orthopedic problems have remained static in the 16 
years since the industrial accident (or may have even improved), 
while the pulmonary problems have become more symptomatic. The 
applicant responded that he never returned to work after his trial 
re-employment in 1977 and that he was awarded Social Security 
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Disability with the onset date being the same date as the 
industrial accident date. The applicant also pointed out that he 
was 63 years old, had only a 9th grade education and had no 
transferable skills. He testified that he has not worked since 
1977 because his right ankle and left knee, in combination, prevent 
him from doing the physical work that he has done for a living all 
his life. 
Just prior to the hearing, the defendant/ self--insured 
employer filed a hearing memorandum in which the employer argued 
the addtional defense that the applicant was barred from pursuing 
a permanent total disability claim for having failed to file an 
application for hearing with the Industrial Commission within 3 
years of the date of the last payment of compensation (last payment 
asserted by the employer to have been in January of 1983 with the 
application for hearing on the permanent total disability claim 
being filed in November of 1990). Counsel for the employer cited 
U.C.A. 35-1-99 for this statute of limitations. At hearing, 
counsel was provided with the citations for Mecham v. Industrial 
Commission, 692 P.2d 783 (Utah 1984) and Buxton v. Industrial 
Commission, 587 P.2d 121 (Utah 1978) as precedent for the 
proposition that there is no separate statute of limitations for 
permanent total disability claims once the initial filing 
requirements are met. However, counsel reasserted the U.C.A. 35-1-
99 3-year statute of limitations defense post-hearing in a letter 
to the ALJ dated April 24, 1992, indicating that he had reviewed 
the cited cases and found they were distinguishable from the 
instant case. In the same letter, counsel cites the 1990 amendment 
to U.C.A. 35-1-98, which does specify a 6-year statute of 
limitations for permanent total disability claims. 
Because the applicant has a history of a number of injuries 
and/or medical problems, after the hearing, the matter was referred 
to a medical panel to have the applicant's impairments rated and 
apportioned as to those existing prior to the industrial accident, 
those caused by the industrial accident and those developing 
subsequent to the industrial accident. The medical panel report 
was received on November 12, 1992 and was distributed to the 
parties on November 13, 1992, with 15 days allowed for objections. 
On November 30, 1992, counsel for the applicant submitted a letter 
to the ALJ requesting that the panel clarify when the applicant's 
pulmonary impairment occurred. The ALJ sent a letter to the panel 
chairman on December 1, 1992 requesting clarification and the 
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chairman responded in a letter received at the Commission on 
January 4, 1993. This clarification report was distributed to the 
parties on January 6, 1993, with an additional 15 days allowed for 
objections. 
On January 14, 1993, counsel for the applicant wrote the ALJ 
requesting a tentative finding of permanent total disability and 
requesting that the attorneys for the self-insured employer and the 
Employers Reinsurance Fund waive the statutorily mandated_referral 
to the Utah State Office of Education Division of Rehabilitation. 
Counsel renewed this request in another letter received at the 
Commission on January 25, 1993. On February 1, 1993, the ALJ 
received a letter from counsel for the employer indicating that no 
waiver was being made, because the employer felt that the 
industrial injury did not cause the applicant to be permanently 
totally disabled (primarily because the majority of the applicant7s 
impairment was related to the non-industrial pulmonary condition). 
On February 22, 1993, the ALJ also received a letter from the 
Employers Reinsurance Fund which indicates that the Fund agreed 
with the employer that the permanent total disability was not 
caused by the industrial injury. Counsel for the applicant 
responded to the letters of the employer and the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund in a letter dated February 23, 1993, indicating 
that even before the development of the pulmonary condition, the 
Social Security Administration had found the applicant disabled as 
of the date of the industrial accident. 
On March 2, 1993, the ALJ wrote counsel for the employer and 
the Employers Reinsurance Fund requesting that they waive the 
statutory referral to the Division of Rehabilitation as logically 
it did not seem possible that the Division would attempt to offer 
rehabilitation to the applicant considering his age and long time 
unemployed status. The ALJ noted that she was not requesting a 
waiver of any of the defenses either party had asserted up to that 
point, merely just a waiver of the rehabilitation referral. On 
March 3, 1993 counsel for the Employers Reinsurance Fund provided 
the ALJ with a stipulation to waive the referral and on March 8, 
1993 counsel for the employer provided the ALJ with a stipulation 
to waive the referral. On March 11, 1993, counsel for the 
applicant filed another letter reiterating that the pulmonary 
problems were never considered by the Social Security 
Administration in awarding the applicant disability benefits and 
indicating that the applicant was awarded the benefits based on 
orthopedic problems that included the right ankle and left knee 
problems that were caused by the 1976 industrial injury at issue. 
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The matter was considered ready for a final order as of March 8, 
1993 when the ALJ received the final stipulation to waive the 
rehabilitation referral from the employer. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant is a male who was 47 years old on the date of 
injury, May 21, 1976, and who had a wife and one minor child as-of 
that date. In school, the applicant completed the 9th grade and 
did attend the 10th grade for a part of a year. The applicant 
testified that he can read, but stated that his writing was 
somewhat illegible. The first employment that he can recall was 
when he drove a pick-up truck for United Supply Delivery. Right 
after that, the applicant started to work as a glazier and did this 
for the rest of his employment life. The applicant was employed 
with Salt Lake City Corporation on the date of injury, having been 
hired by Salt Lake City on March 2, 1971. The applicant worked as 
a maintenance man and glazier at the Salt Lake City Airport. The 
applicant plowed runways in the winter using heavy equipment and 
mowed lawns during the spring and summer. He operated other heavy 
equipment as well, including front end loaders, backhoes and 
graders. The applicant also was an experienced glazier and had 
worked as a glazier for Granite School District from May 19 65 
through February 1971. Part of the applicant's responsibilities at 
the Salt Lake City Airport was installing glass. The applicant was 
earning $950.00 per month as of the date of injury, or 
approximately $219.40 per week. On May 21, 1976, the applicant was 
unloading a crate of glass when the crate tipped over and the glass 
fell on the applicant, primarily effecting his right lower 
extremity. 
The applicant had surgery on his right ankle on May 21, 1976 
and later had left knee surgery on September 8, 1976, which was 
determined to be related to the industrial accident as well. 
Almost immediately after the surgery on the left knee, the 
applicant was hospitalized again for a pulmonary embolus. 
Approximately mid-January 1977, the applicant returned to work for 
Salt Lake City Corporation, apparently doing his normal work 
duties. The applicant recalls returning to work in December of 
1976, but the majority of the documentary evidence reflects a 
return to work on approximately January 13, 1977. On approximately 
February 4, 1977, the applicant was at work carrying a bundle of 
chain link fencing when his left knee and right foot gave way, 
causing him to fall to the ground. It is not clear whether or not 
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the applicant actually caused any aggravation to his left knee or 
right foot when this occurred, but he did not return to work after 
that injury. The applicant stated that the combination of problems 
with his left knee and right ankle caused him to be unable to walk 
and stand for any time, caused inability to lift greater than 25 
pounds and prevented him from bending and stooping. He testified 
that Salt Lake City told him that he was terminated because he was 
unable to perform the duties that were required of him at the Salt 
Lake City Airport. However, Salt Lake City presented a copy of a 
May 10, 1977 letter sent to the applicant indicating that he was to 
go to personnel to see what other jobs might be available to him. 
At hearing, it was determined that the letter was not sent to the 
applicant's proper home address and the applicant does not recall 
receiving the letter. 
On May 24, 1977, Dr. E. Heyes, the orthopedic surgeon that 
performed both the ankle and knee surgery following the industrial 
accident, wrote a letter to Salt Lake City Corporation indicating 
that the applicant could return to light duty work operating a 
motor vehicle as of April 25, 1977. However, the applicant 
testified that he was unable to operate a clutch vehicle due to his 
left knee and therefore was only able to drive a vehicle with an 
automatic transmission. The applicant testified at hearing that he 
could not really remember the events that transpired in mid-1977 
with respect to his failed return to work. He recalls only that he 
was unable to perform the work that he had performed all his life 
(presumably glass installation) because of the left knee and right 
ankle injuries and he recalls that there was no light duty 
available to him at the airport. 
On June 13, 1977, the applicant applied for social security 
disability and on June 17, 1977, the applicant filed an application 
for hearing with the Industrial Commission because he felt that the 
impairment ratings he had been given were inusfficient (Dr. Heyes 
had rated the ankle at 15% and the left knee at 5%, but his ratings 
were non-specific and thus it is unclear if he was rating the lower 
extremity or the whole person). From June of 1977 through May of 
1978, the applicant was involved in litigating both his claim for 
social security disability benefits and his claim for additional 
workers compensation impairment benefits. During this time, the 
applicant got no treatment for either his left knee or his right 
ankle. However, he did begin to see Dr. W. Hebertson during this 
period, in October of 1977, for back pain. 
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The Industrial Commission litigation: 
A hearing was held on September 19, 1977. The 
matter was referred to a medical panel for 
additional input with respect to what impairments 
resulted due to the industrial accident. The 
medical panel report was issued on March 21, 1978 
and rated the right foot at 12% whole person and 
the left knee at 5% whole person, for- a total 
industrial impairment of 16% whole person. The 
panel concluded that the back problems and right 
elbow problems were not related to the May 21, 1976 
industrial accident. The panel report indicates 
that the panel relied on office notes of Dr. E. 
Heyes dated prior to the industrial accident for 
their conclusion that the right elbow problems pre-
existed the industrial accident. Those office 
notes are not included in the medical record 
exhibit (Exhibit A-l) presently being utilized for 
the instant litigation. On May 10, 1978, Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were entered 
awarding the applicant temporary total compensation 
(TTC) from May 22, 1976 though January 12, 1977 and 
from February 4, 1977 through April 25, 1977 and 
awarding permanent impairment benefits based on the 
16% whole person rated by the panel. 
The Social Security Litigation: 
Responding to the applicant's June 13, 1977 
application for disability benefits, Social 
Security denied the application on September 29, 
1977, stating that the applicant was capable of 
doing light work. On October 31, 1977, the 
applicant filed a request for reconsideration, 
indicating that his movement was so resticted that 
he could not work. He noted that the doctor had 
told him that he didn't want the applicant even 
looking for work and didn't want the applicant 
going to school until he was recovered. The 
applicant asserted that he could only walk with a 
cane and could do no lifting. On December 13, 
1977, Social Security again denied benefits, 
indicating that the applicant could still do 
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sedentary work and that his experience as a glazier 
resulted in him having transferable skills. On 
January 27, 1978, the applicant filed a request for 
hearing. On May 31, 1978, the applicant was 
awarded disability benefits based primarily on the 
right ankle and secondarily on the low back, with 
the left knee mentioned as an additional problem. 
Apparently, the Social Security ALJ relied a great 
deal on the testimony of a vocational expert who 
found that the applicant did not have the-residual 
functional capacity to perform substantial gainful 
employment. The benefits awarded were to begin as 
of May 21, 1976. 
From August of 1978 through August of 1979, the applicant 
saw Dr. Hebertson almost exclusively. Dr. Hebertson's office notes 
are brief and illegible and his periodic letters to Salt Lake City 
Corporation are very brief. Dr. Hebertson just lists the 
applicant's complaints in his letters and office notes and those 
include: right ankle pain, back pain, left knee pain, right elbow 
pain, and neck pain. Apparently, the only treatment provided by 
Dr. Hebertson was presciption medication. This medication included 
percodan or percocet (apparently at one point tylox was 
substituted), either dalmane, Seconal, nebutal or halcion, Valium, 
and varying combinations of rela, indocin or fiorinal. The 
frequency and amount of percodan or percocet was gradually 
increased during 1979 and 1980. By 1981, the amount prescribed was 
a regular and consistent 100 per month. This continued along with 
the other medications through 1988, when the the amount of 
percodan/percocet was reduced to 60 per month. The prescription 
refill notes continue in Dr. Hebertson's records through 1990. 
In August of 1979, the applicant began alternating his 
visits with Dr. Hebertson with visits to Dr. Jonathon Home. The 
applicant saw Dr. Home for his left knee and right ankle and per 
numerous indications in Dr. Home's notes, the applicant told Dr. 
Home that he could not take medication for his knee and ankle due 
to an ulcer problem. Dr. Home was thus under the impression that 
some other form of treatment was necessary. Dr. Home performed a 
second knee surgery on November 12, 1979 and a second ankle surgery 
on March 10, 1980. The applicant saw Dr. Home regularly, in 
between visits to Dr. Hebertson, through September of 1980. In 
September of 1980, Dr. Home rated the applicant's impairment to 
the left knee and right ankle at 32% whole person (twice the amount 
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rated by the previous medical panel) and this prompted the 
applicant to file a second application for hearing with the 
Industrial Commission. The matter was again referred to a medical 
panel which rated the applicants impairment at a total of 14% 
whole person (actually less than the 16% rated by the original 
panel) . Additional impairment benefits were denied in the final 
order (issued on December 31, 1982) but additional temporary total 
compensation was awarded, apparently related to the two additional 
surgeries performed by Dr. Home, 
From October 1980 through March of 1982, the applicant 
alternated between seeing Dr. Hebertson for his presciptions and 
going to the VA Hospital for pulmonary related problems. In 
October of 1982, the applicants Social Security disabilty award 
came up for review and the applicant represented to Social Security 
at that time that he needed 2 canes to walk, that he didn't drive, 
that he needed assistance bathing and that he was unable to do 
anything physical. In connection with the review, Dr. Home issued 
a report in November of 1982 indicating that the applicant would 
need a right ankle arthrodesis within the next year or two because 
of increased arthritis in the foot joints. Dr. Home noted that 
the applicant's foot was likely to get worse and that the applicant 
could only walk one block before he experienced severe pain in the 
foot. Dr. G. Zeluff did an examination and analysis of the 
applicant's condition in December of 1982, apparently at the 
request of Social Security. His report sates that he felt the 
applicant's complaints were out of proportion to his examination 
findings. He noted that there was only minimal degenerative 
changes in the back, right ankle and left knee. Dr. Hebertson also 
did a report for Social Security in December of 1982 and just lists 
the applicant's complaints as: right chest soreness, low back pain, 
right foot pain, pain and swelling in the left knee, intrascapular 
pain, arthritic finger pain and headaches. Dr. Hebertson notes 
that he had done no range of motion testing, had taken no X-rays 
and had done no inquiry with respect to the applicant's activity 
restrictions. 
On January 11, 1983, the applicant's Social Security 
benefits were discontinued. The decision to discontinue benefits 
notes that the applicant was able to do substantial gainful 
activity as of January of 1983, It was noted that the applicant's 
breathing capacity was "O.K.11 and that his loss of range of motion 
in the ankle, head and back was only moderate, with no loss of 
range of motion in the left knee. The arthritis in the left knee 
and right ankle was determined to be moderate and it was decided 
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that the applicant could use his hands and arms without 
restricition. It was noted that the applicant could walk 
adequately and that he could perform light work. Transferable 
skills were found to exist. On March 7, 1983, the applicant filed 
a request for reconsideration and on October 26, 1983, benefits 
were reinstated. The reinstatement decision indicates that a 
combination of problems caused the applicant to be disabled. 
Specifically noted was the applicant's arthritis, secondary to his 
orthopedic problems. It was determined that the arthritis caused 
incapacitating pain. The applicant's residual functional capacity 
was determined to be at the sedentary level, with the applicant 
having no transferable skills. The applicant's advanced age, and 
his minimal education were also noted. Benefits were awarded 
continuous from May 21, 1976. 
From March of 1983 through May of 1985, the applicant saw 
Dr. Hebertson primarily for his prescriptions, with only an 
occasional visit to Dr. Home. In August of 1983, a Dr. R. Daynes 
wrote the applicant after examining him and stated that it was 
advisable for the applicant to reduce his daily percodan intake as 
well as his alcohol intake. Beginning in June of 1985, the 
applicant saw only Dr. Hebertson through August of 1987. The 
applicant continued to see Dr. Hebertson only through August of 
1990, except that he had continuing visits to the VA Hospital for 
his pulmonary problems. 
III. Specific Problems; 
In order to make it easier for the medical panel to assess 
the impairments, the ALJ presented the panel with the following 
list of specific problems noted in the medical records, with a 
breakdown based on what problems surfaced prior to the industrial 
accident and which became apparent only after the industrial 
accident. 
A. RIGHT ANKLE: 
1. Prior to May 21, 1976 - no mention made in medical 
records 
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2. After May 21, 1976 -
5-21-76 SURGERY - by Dr. E. Heyes at St. Mark's Hospital 
- Procedure: repair of laceration of posterior 
deltoid ligament 
2-4-77 slip and fall when applicant attempted return to 
work - treated by Dr. Heyes 
9-1-77 continuing problems described by Dr. D. Loken as 
pain in the foot and ankle except if the 
applicant walked on the lateral border of the 
foot, with numbness in the heel, and swelling of 
the ankle - rated at 10% (non-specific with 
respect to lower extremity or whole man) 
3-21-78 Industrial Commission medical panel rates the 
ankle at 12% whole person 
9-19-79 Dr. J. Home attempts treating ankle with a short 
leg walking cast - this apparently is helpful 
with the applicant supposedly telling Dr. Home 
that he was able to run up or down stairs by 
October of 1979 
12-19-79 Dr. J. Home tries using a leather brace to treat 
the ankle and indicates that the applicant may 
someday need a fusion - the ankle brace does not 
improve the applicant's symptoms 
2-11-80 Dr. J. Home does an X-ray of the ankle and notes 
increased bone chips 
3-10-80 SURGERY - by Dr. J. Home at Cottonwood Hospital 
- Procedure: arthrotomy and excision of bone 
spurs of fibula and talus - in follow-up, by 4-80 
Dr. Home notes that the applicant is able to 
walk with a flat foot, but aching still is 
present 
6-7-80 CT scan done at Western Neurological Associates 
is read to show the only abnormality to be soft 
tissue calcifications just below the lateral 
malleous 
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6-23-80 Dr. J. Home notes that the ankle still swells 
and has pain and he rates the ankle at 30% of the 
lower extremity 
6-28-82 Dr. J. Home lists the diagnosis for the ankle as 
subtalar joint arthritis and mild recurrent spurs 
in the fibula/talar joint - he tries treating the 
arthritis with feldene 
11-17-82 Industrial Commission medical panel rates - the 
ankle at 19% of the lower extremity (8% whole 
person) and finds that a fusion may be necessary 
in the distant future 
11-29-82 Dr. J. Home tells Social Security that the 
applicant will need an arthrodesis of the ankle 
in the next year or two due to increased 
arthritis in the foot joints 
B. LEFT ANKLE 
records 
1. Prior to May 21, 1976 - no mention made in medical 
2. After May 21, 1976 -
11-24-84 the applicant is seen at Cottonwood Hospital for 
a left ankle sprain - Dr. Home follows-up with 
at short leg cast and the injury is apparently 
resolved by December of 1984 when the cast is 
removed 
C. LEFT KNEE 
records 
1. Prior to May 21, 1976 - no mention made in medical 
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2. After May 21, 1976 -
9-8-76 SURGERY by Dr. E. Heyes at St. Mark's Hospital -
Procedure: arthrostomy followed by arthrotomy and 
medical menisectomy 
9-1-77 Dr. D. Loken describes continuing problems as 
numbness in the lateral aspect, with the knee 
giving out when weight is placed on it - it is 
noted that the applicant needs to hold on to 
something when he is going upstairs - Dr. Loken 
rates the knee at 5% of the lower extremity 
3-21-78 Industrial Commission medical panel rates the 
knee at 5% whole person 
11-12-79 SURGERY by Dr. J. Home at Cottonwood Hospital -
Procedure: 1) arthroscopy, 2) debridement of 
chondromalacia (patella), 3) debridement of 
chondromalacia (medial femoral condyle) 4) 
lateral fasciotomy - Post-operative diagnosis: 
severe chondromalacia of patella medial femoral 
condyle left knee, scarred superpatellar synovial 
band left knee 
6-23-80 Dr. J. Home notes that the knee still swells and 
is painful -he rates the knee at 2 0% of the lower 
extremity 
11-17-82 Industrial Commission medical panel rates the 
left knee at 14% of the lower extremity or 6% 
whole person - the panel finds that a joint 
replacement may be necessary in the distant 
future 
D. BACK 
1. Prior to May 21, 1976 -
1966 per the applicant's testimony, he was involved in 
a car accident in 1966 which resulted in the need 
for 5 days of traction in the hospital 
(Cottonwood Hospita) - medical records for this 
incident are not included in the current medical 
record exhibit 
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4-7-72 Dr. J. Home notes that the applicant fell in a 
grease pit and landed on his left hip - this 
caused the applicant to twist his low back and 
bruise the left iliac crest - diagnosed as a 
sprain/strain of the lumbosacral spine, doubted 
herniated nucleous pulpous - treated with 
percodan, robaxin and a lumbosacral corset -
apparently resolved after several months of 
seeing Dr. Home - unclear if this accident is 
the same one mentioned by the applicant -at 
hearing in which he fell backwards and hit his 
low back (about 2 inches above the tailbone) on a 
concrete edge 
2. After May 21, 1976 -
4-1-77 Dr. D. Loken notes that the back pain began about 
February or March of 1977 (around the time that 
the applicant fell with the chain link fence upon 
attempting to return to work after the industrial 
accident of 5-21-76) - Dr. Loken notes no 
neurological findings and no X-ray findings 
9-27-77 Dr. E. Heyes writes Social Security and indicates 
that the applicant felt that the back pain he was 
having was due to his limping - D. Heyes notes 
that this is possible 
10-17-77 Dr. Hebertson notes that the applicant may have 
twisted his back when he was carrying the chain 
link fence at work around February 4, 1977 
1-78 through 5-78 
Dr. Hebertson makes repeated notations 
that the applicant needs to have a myelogram -
apparently this is never done 
1-17-83 Dr. Home notes that the applicant has had back 
pain on and off since the 1966 car accident - he 
notes no neurological findings and normal 
reflexes, range of motion, sensation and power -
Dr. Home's diagnosis is: 1) mild degenerative 
changes, narrowing at L5-S1, 2) mild herniation 
or possible herniation at L5-S1 and 3) chronic 
sprain/strain of lumbosacral spine 
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5-1-85 *"^ applicant sees Dr. Home regarding back pain 
E. RIGHT ELBOW: 
1. Prior to May 21, 1976: 
3-21-78 the medical panel report of this date indicates 
that the panel had office notes of Dr. E. Heyes 
varifying a right elbow condition treated by Dr. 
Heyes prior to the industrial accident - these 
office notes are not included in the present 
medical record exhibit 
2. After May 21, 1976: 
6-8-77 SURGERY by Dr. E. Heyes at St. Mark's Hospital -
Procedure: exploration and partial division of 
annular ligament 
9-1-77 Dr. D. Loken finds that the right elbow has 
minimal symptoms at this point 
F. LEFT ELBOW: 
1. Prior to May 21, 1976: 
6-8-70 Dr. J* Home notes that the applicant had a left 
elbow contusion while fishing 
2. After May 21, 1976: 
4-2-86 Dr. J. Home notes that the applicant fell on his 
left elbow 
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G. PULMONARY PROBLEMS: 
1. Prior to May 21, 1976: 
3-14-72 a chest X-ray at St. Mark's Hospital (apparently 
taken while the applicant was an inpatient for an 
ulcer) shows some findings 
5-21-76 while the applicant is hospitalized at St. Mark's 
Hospital for his right ankle industrial injury, 
the records note that the applicant had pneumonia 
in 1974 leaving right lower lobe scars - the 
records also note that the applicant is being 
followed by Dr. Abaunza for repeated shortness of 
breath 
2. After May 21, 1976: 
9-13-76 through 9-21-76 
the applicant is hospitalized at St. Mark's 
Hospital for chest pain and a suspected pulmonary 
embolus and is treated by Dr. K. Ritchie with 
anti-coagulants 
10-14-80 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for a 6-
week cough - it is noted that the applicant is a 
40-50 pack year smoker 
10-22-80 through 11-13-80 the applicant is hospitalized at 
the VA Hospital for an abnormal mass seen on a 
chest X-ray - the applicant undergoes a number of 
procedures including: 1) a bronchoscopy on 10-24-
80, 2) a rigid brondchoscopy and right middle and 
right lower lobectomy on 10-31-80 - the discharge 
diagnosis is: endobrachial hamartoma, right lower 
lobe 
1-7-81 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for an 
upper respiratory tract infection 
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2-24-81 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for 
post-surgical thoracic pain which is treated with 
an intercostal block injection and elavil 
3-22-81 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for 
chest wall pain 
4-25-81 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for 
pleural effusion 
5-81 the applicant is seen at the University Hospital 
Pain Clinic for difficulty managing the post-
surgical chest pain 
5-19-81 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for 
acute bronchitis 
3-7-92 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for 
chest wall pain 
11-17-82 the Industrial Commission medical panel finds 
that the applicant's respiratory problems are due 
to a tumor which may have been present as early 
as the date of injury (5-21-76) but is unrelated 
causally to the industrial accident 
3-7-85 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital as a 
result of upper respiratory tract infections with 
sharp chest pain in December of 1984 and January 
of 1985 
12-22-87, 12-29-87 and 1-9-88 
the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and/or 
chronic bronchitis 
9-26-88 pulmonary fucntion tests are done at the VA 
Hospital and it is determined that the applicant 
has moderate obstruction 
11-5-88 the applicnat is seen at the VA Hospital for 
chest pain - an EKG is read as normal - follow-
ups occur on 11-22-88 and 11-28-88 
1-24-89 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for an 
increase in his chronic shortness of breath 
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3-7-89 pulmonary function tests are done at the VA 
Hospital and it is again determined that the 
applicant has moderate obstruction 
3-29-89 through 4-5-89 
the applicant is an in-patient at the VA Hospital 
due to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease -
follow-up occurs on 5-30-89 
6-10-89, 7-19-89, 7-21-89 
the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital due to 
acute exacerbations of his chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease 
H, HEADACHES 
1. Prior to May 21, 1976: 
1947 the applicant is struck in the head by a hoist 
cable while unloading a boat while he was in the 
military - the applicant recalls that he had loss 
of conciousness, possibly for more than one day, 
and he develops periodic headaches thereafter 
2. After May 21, 1976: 
12-80 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for 
syncope, dizzy spells and nausea and an acoustic 
neuroma is ruled out - extensive testing occurs 
8-14-87 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for 
headaches which is noted to be related to a head 
trauma in the service - it is noted that the 
headaches have increased over the last few years 
and that the headaches are associated with 
photophobia 
9-3-87 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital in 
follow-up on his headaches and elvavil is 
prescribed 
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I. PSYCHIATRIC 
1. Prior to May 21, 1976: 
1964 the applicant is voluntarily committed to a 
hospital in California - the applicant testified 
that he was there for 2 months and received 
therapy and medication during his stay - per the 
applicant's testimony, he was depressed and had 
put his fist through a wall prior to his 
admission without provocation 
2. After May 21, 1976: 
5-81 though 7-81 the applicant is taught relaxation 
techniques at the VA Hospital to deal with his 
post-surgical chest pain -the applicant is also 
given amitriptylline 
Briefly mentioned in the medical records or testimony were 
several things that developed prior to May 21, 1976. The applicant 
was hospitalized (at St. Mark's Hospital) in March of 1972 for an 
ulcer problem and Dr. W. Hebertson did a consult during this 
hospital stay for hand/arm numbness that the applicant was 
experiencing. The applicant also had some neck problems associated 
with the back injury that he had in the 1966 car accident. Dr. 
Hebertson lists neck complaints occasionally in his list of 
symptoms that he was treating with "drug therapy." The applicant 
also had some vision impairment prior to the industrial accident 
which the applicant contends is verified by the 4-6-76 report of 
Dr. Quinn that is attached to the top of the medical record 
exhibit. In addition, the applicant states that he feels that his 
hearing got gradually worse after he got out of the service and 
thus he feels that he had some hearing loss at the time of the 
industrial accident, but there are no medical records regarding his 
hearing dated prior to the industrial accident. 
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The medical panel consisted of Dr. M. Thomas, a neurologist, 
Dr. W. Hess, an orthopedist and Dr. R. Burgoyne, a psychiatrist. 
The panel concluded that the applicant's whole person impairment 
was as follows: 12% for the right ankle (all attributable to the 5-
21-76 accident), 5% for the left knee (all attributable to the 5-
21-76 accident) , 2% for the left ankle (all attributable to 
problems arising AFTER the industrial accident), 10% for the low 
back (2.5% attrtibutable to problems existing BEFORE the industrial 
accident and 7.5% attributable to problems arising AFTER the 
industrial accident) and 1% for the applicant's macular 
degeneration (all attributable to problems arising AFTER the 
industrial accident). The panel found that the applicant had 0% 
permanent impairment related to the following problems noted in the 
medical records: right elbow status post division of annular 
ligament, somatoform pain disorder and thinking disorder (in 
remission), and headahces. Per the clarification report submitted 
by the panel at the ALJ's request on January 4, 1993, the 
applicant's 40% whole person impairment related to the pulmonary 
condition (status post-partial pneumonectomy for hamartoma with 
COPD, moderate impairment, stable) was wholly attributable to 
problems arising AFTER the industrial accident. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Preliminary Conclusions: 
The ALJ adopts the findings of the medical panel with 
respect to the applicant's impairment ratings and the indications 
as to when the impairments arose. There have been no real 
objections to the panel findings and the panel ratings are not 
seriously contradicted by any other medical evidence. Therefore, 
the ALJ will use the panel ratings to assess the applicant's 
relative physical impairments and their impact on his permanent 
disability. The ALJ presumes that neither defendant (the employer 
nor the Employers Reinsurance Fund) contests a finding that the 
applicant is currently unable to return to any of his previous work 
and that he is currently.not susceptible to rehabilitation.. The 
ALJ bases this presumption on the fact that no evidence has been 
presented with respect to the applicant's ability to work at this 
time and on the fact that the defendants have waived a referral for 
a determination regarding the applicant's susceptibility to 
rehabilitation. 
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Statute of Limitations: 
The ALJ finds that the applicant is not barred from claiming 
permanent total disability benefits due to the 3-year filing 
requirement in U.C.A. 35-1-99, as it read on the date of the 
applicant's industrial injury, or due to the 1990 amendment to 
U.C.A. 35-1-98, as counsel for the employer has argued. The ALJ 
finds that the 1990 amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-98 (specifying a 6-
year statute of limitations for permanent total disability claims) 
is not applicable, because that amendment was enacted 14 years 
after the applicant's date of injury. The employer has provided no 
explanation regarding why this amended version of U.C.A. 35-1-98 
should apply to this case, and thus the ALJ will simply follow the 
well established principal that the law as of the date of injury is 
the correct law to apply. Although the ALJ finds that the U.C.A. 
35-1-99 provision cited by counsel for the employer was the law at 
the time of the applicant's injury, the ALJ finds that case law 
narrowly limits the application of that 3-year filing requirement 
so that it does not bar the applicant's claim in this case. 
The Mecham case cited at the beginning of this order is 
factually almost identical to this case. In that case, the 
applicant had a 19 61 injury which was litigated at the Industrial 
Commission from 1964 through 1966. Pursuant to that litigation, 
the applicant was awarded benefits for a permanent partial 
impairment only. The last payment of compensation was made in 
December of 1964. It was not until December of 1982, that the 
applicant formally filed a claim for permanent total disability 
benefits with the Commission. The claim was dismissed by the ALJ 
because the claim was filed more than 3 years after the last 
payment of compensation. The Supreme Court reversed this ruling, 
noting that the applicant had met the 3-year filing requirement, 
because reports were filed just after the date of injury by the 
employer and the applicant's physicians. The Court found that the 
filing of these reports created jurisdiction for the Commission and 
that to determine if there was any further time limits for filing, 
one had to consult the particular statute dealing with the kind of 
benefits being claimed (in the case of permanent total disability 
benefits, the particular statute is U.C.A. 35-1-67) . The Court 
found that U.C.A. 35-1-67 contained no separate time limit for 
filing a permanent total disability claim and thus the 18 year time 
lapse between the last payment of compensation and the 1982 filing 
with the Commission did not act as a bar to the applicant's 
permanent total disability claim. 
ORDER 
RE: GERALD HANSEN 
PAGE 21 
The ALJ does not understand why counsel for the employer 
feels that the Mecham case is not on point. One need only change 
the dates and the facts are almost identical. Absent some better 
explanation from counsel as to why he feels the Mecham case is 
inapplicable, the ALJ must conclude that the Mecham case is the 
ruling precedent on the applicability of the U.C.A. 35-1-99 3-year 
statute of limitations to the instant case. Based on the Court's 
ruling in Mecham, the applicant in the instant case met the 3-year 
filing requirement back in 1976 when reports were filed with the 
Commission and thus he does not need to again meet-the requirement 
after the last payment of compensation in order to file a permanent 
total disability claim. Based on this ruling, the ALJ will proceed 
to decide the merits of the applicant's claim for permanent total 
disability benefits. 
The Cause of the Permanent Total Disability; 
The main issue in this case is whether the applicant's 
inability to work has been caused by the 1976 industrial injury. 
Counsel for the employer has cited the cases Large v. Industrial 
Commission, 758 P. 2d 954 (Utah App. 1988) and Hodges v. Western 
Piling & Sheeting Co. , 717 P. 2d 713 (Utah 1986) for the proposition 
that an award of permanent total disability benefits can only be 
made where it is the industrial injury that causes the disability 
(as opposed to a situation where an industrial injury occurs, but 
some other factor or condition causes the disability). The ALJ 
agrees that these two cases stand for the proposition that there 
must be some causal link between the industrial injury and the 
inability to work. 
Both the employer and the Employers Reinsurance Fund have 
argued that, currently, the applicant's most disabling condition is 
his respiratory condition. Certainly, the 40% whole person rating 
that the panel has assessed for that condition makes it clear that 
the respiratory impairment is the most significant impairment that 
the applicant has currently. However, in analyzing what is the 
cause of the permanent total disability, the proper time focus is 
not necessarily on the applicant's impairment status at the date of 
hearing, but rather his impairment status at the date that he 
discontinued working. Also, physical impairment alone is not the 
only relevant criteria for determining what is causing an 
individual to be unable to work. In deterining whether an 
industrial injury causes permanent total disability, the ALJ finds 
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that it is appropriate to look at the time at which the applicant 
discontinued working and then to determine what factor or factors 
(including, but not limited to physical impairment) caused the 
applicant to discontinue his/her working status. 
Unfortunately, the absence of a separate statute of 
limitations for permanent total disability claims allows for 
significant time delays between the discontinuance of work and the 
filing of a permanent total disability claim. These time delays in 
turn cause the employer or carrier to be unable to perform any 
meaningful discovery with respect to the cause of the 
discontinuance of work. This certainly has occurred in this case. 
Because the applicant discontinued working in 1977 and did not file 
a permanent total disability claim until late 1991, information 
regarding what was happening in 1977 for the applicant is very 
sparse. In addition, in this particular case, this lack of 
information is compounded by the fact that the applicant recalls 
very little about why he discontinued working and what efforts he 
made, or could have made, to continue working in 1977. Finally, 
clearly the statute anticipates that there will be some efforts at 
rehabilitation once an injured employee determines he is unable to 
return to his prior employment because of a job injury. However, 
at this point, the defendants and the Division of Rehabilitation 
cannot even attempt to offer rehabilitation, because the applicant 
has developed a post-injury significant respiratory condition, 
because he is now nearly retirement age, and because he has not 
worked for the past 16 years. 
Based on the foregoing concerns, the ALJ does not feel that 
she has very accurate information on which to make a determination 
as to what caused the applicant to discontinue working in 1977. 
Nevertheless, the ALJ must look at what information there is and 
make this determination. The applicant testified that his right 
ankle and left knee injuries on May 21, 1976 prevented him from 
doing the fairly heavy work that a glazier is required to perform. 
Therefore, when he was unable to return as a glazier for Salt Lake 
City Corporation in February 1977, and because he believed he could 
no longer perform this occupation, the applicant proceeded to apply 
for Social Security Disability benefits at that time. The ALJ 
feels that it is logical that the knee and ankle impairments 
prevented the heavy lifting, prolonged standing and stooping 
required in glass installation work. However, there is certainly 
some indication in the medical records that the applicant might 
have been able to perform some other kind of work, nothwithstanding 
the knee and ankle impairments, in 1977. Dr. Heyes suggested that 
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the applicant could be a driver and the applicant's initial 
applications for Social Security Disability benefits were denied 
because it was determined that he could still do light work. 
Whereas rehabilitation currently is certainly untenable, in 1977 
the applicant might have been able to return to some kind of work 
had he sought or been offered some minimal new training. 
Although logically it appears that return to work was not 
completely foreclosed as of 1977, it would be speculative to -find 
that the applicant was susceptible-to rehabilitation at that time. 
No concrete evidence as been presented to support this conclusion. 
Of course, as noted above, the long wait to file for permanent 
total disability benefits is the primary cause of the lack of 
concrete evidence on this point. However, regardless of the 
reason, there simply is insufficient evidence to show the applicant 
was susceptible to rehabilitation in 1977. In 1978, after hearing 
and testimony from a vocational expert, it was finally determined 
that the applicant was disabled and entitled to Social Security 
Disability benefits. It is interesting that the applicant was 
initially denied continued disability benefits in 1983 when the 
Social Security Administration reassessed the applicant's 
disability status. Once again, it was asserted that by the Social 
Security Administration that the applicant was capable of light 
work, but in the final analysis, the applicant again was determined 
disabled and his benefits were reinstated so as to be continuous 
from the date of the industrial injury on. Based on the minimal 
evidence available (primarily the Social Security Disability 
records), the ALJ would have to say that the preponderance of the 
evidence shows that the applicant has been disabled since the date 
of his industrial injury, May 21, 1976, to the present. 
The only remaining question is whether the past 16 years of 
disability have been caused by the May 21, 197 6 industrial 
accident. Once again, per the most relevant evidence available, 
the Social Security Disability records reflect that the disability 
benefits paid during this period were based on the applicant's 
orthopedic problems, including the right ankle and left knee 
impairment (solely attrtibutable to the industrial injury per the 
medical panel) as well as the low back (wholly non-industrial per 
the panel). There is no way of knowing whether the non-industrial 
back impairment alone would have been a sufficient basis for 
awarding the Social Security benefits. Although it is not 
completely clear why the ankle and knee problems are always listed 
first on the determination synopsis sheets, it may be that these 
were found to be the more significant problems. The panel did rate 
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the left knee and right ankle combined somewhat higher than the 
back. In addition, there is very little mention of the back 
problems in the medical records and very little treatment for the 
back during the past 16 years. More attention has been paid to the 
left knee and right ankle, per the medical records. Therefore, 
based on the scant information available, the ALJ finds that the 
primary cause of the applicant's disability during the past 16 
years has been the left knee and right ankle impairments sustained 
in the May 21, 1976 industrial accident. 
In conclusion, the ALJ finds that the applicant has been 
disabled since the industrial injury on May 21, 197 6 and that the 
primary cause of this disability has been the industrial injuries 
to the left knee and right ankle that were sustained on May 21, 
1976. As the defendants have waived any referral to the Division 
of Rehabilitation, the ALJ finds it is appropriate to make a final 
award of permanent total disability benefits associated with the 
May 21, 1976 industrial accident. 
Benefits Due: 
Prior Industrial Commission orders were entered on May 10, 
1978,. awarding the applicant $6,737.15 in temporary total 
compensation and $5,158.23 in permanent impairment benefits, and on 
December 31, 1982 awarding the applicant $1,785.24 in additional 
temporary total compensation. The compensation rate used in both 
of those orders was $148.77/week. The ALJ presumes that the 
amounts awarded in these orders, a total of $13,680.61, constitutes 
the full payment that has been made by Salt Lake City Corporation 
on the May 21, 1976 industrial accident. Salt Lake City's 
liability for permanent total disability amounts to 312 weeks at 
the maximum rate for permanent total disability benefits in May 
1976 ($131.75), or a total of $41,106.00. Of that amount 
$27,425.39 remains to be paid ($41,106.00 - $13,680.61). That 
amount is accrued and due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest 
and less the attorney fees to be adressed below. The Employers 
Reinsurance Fund's liability for continuing benefits begins at the 
conclusion of the initial 312 weeks or on January 30, 1983 (using 
a start date February 5, 1977, the day following the last date of 
work) . The Employers Reinsurance Fund is to pay benefits at 
$131.75 per week, or at the minimum rate for permanent total 
disability applicable if that is higher. 
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Attorney fees are based on the benefits generated by the 
attorney in the first 312 weeks per Commission rule R568-1-7, or 
$27,425.39. Per the rule, the attorney fees are $3,000.00 (20% of 
the first $15,000.00 generated) + $1,8631.81 (15% of the remainder 
if it is less than $15,000.00, as it is in this case, $12,725.39 x 
.15) or a total of $4,863.81. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant, Salt Lake City 
Corporation (Self-Insured), pay the applicant, Gerald Hansen, 
permanent total disability benefits, at the rate of $131.75 per 
week, for 312 weeks, or a total of $41,106.00, for the permanent 
total disability resulting from the May 21, 1976 industrial 
accident. That amount is accrued and due and payable in a lump 
sum, less the $13,680.61 paid to date, plus interest at 8% per 
annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78, and less the attorney fees to.be awarded 
below. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant, Salt Lake City 
Corporation (Self-Insured), pay all medical expenses incurred as 
the result of the May 21, 1976 industrial accident; said expenses 
to be paid in accordance with the medical and surgical fee schedule 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant, Salt Lake City 
Corporation (Self-Insured), pay Virginius Dabney, attorney for the 
applicant, the sum of $4,8 63.81, plus the percentage of interest 
that is appropriate per R568-1-7, for services rendered in this 
matter, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid award to the 
applicant, and to be remitted directly to the office of Virginius 
Dabney. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund shall prepare the necessary vouchers directing the 
State Treasurer, as Custodian of the Employers Reinsurance Fund to 
place the applicant, Gerald Hansen, on the Employers Reinsurance 
Fund payroll as of Janaury 30, 1983, with payments to be made to 
him at the rate of $131.75 per week, or at the minimum applicable 
rate if that is higher. Said payments to the applicant should 
continue for the remainder of his life or until further notice from 
the Commission. Accrued payments are due and payable in a lump 
sum, plus interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
A ^/xX — ^ s -
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
Certified by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah,- this 
//T^ day of ^yrj^^rA , ,1993 
ATTEST: 
^UrZ^O 
Patricia O. Ashby 
Commission Secretaf 
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I certify that on March , 1993, a copy of the 
attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the 
case of Gerald Hansen, was mailed to the following persons at the 
following addresses, postage paid: 
Gerald Hansen 
1885 West Bowling Avenue 
SLC, UT 84119 
Virginius Dabney 
Attorney at Law 
350 South 400 East 
SLC, UT 84111 
Ray Montgomery 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
451 South State STreet, #505 
SLC, UT 84111 
Erie V. Boorman 
Administrator 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
160 East 3 00 South 
SLC, UT 84114-6612 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
GERALD R. HANSEN, * 
Applicant, * 
* 
vs. * 
* 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION and * 
EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
Mr. Hansen alleges that on May 21, 1976, he became totally and 
permanently disabled because of an industrial injury suffered while 
employed by Salt Lake City. The ALJ awarded permanent total 
disability benefits to Mr. Hansen. Salt Lake City then filed this 
Motion For Review, challenging the ALJ's decision on a number of 
different grounds. Because the Commission concludes that Mr. 
Hansen has failed to establish that his industrial accident in 1976 
caused his now-claimed permanent total disability, the Commission 
does not specifically address the other points raised by Salt Lake 
City. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over 
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the 
ALJ's decision. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Under Utah's Workers Compensation Act, Mr. Hansen is entitled 
to permanent total disability compensation only if he proves that 
his 1976 injury caused his now-claimed permanent total disability. 
See Utah Code Ann.§ 35-1-67(1); also Large v. Industrial 
Commission, 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah App. 1988). Other issues 
regarding Mr. Hansen's claim are not reached unless he first 
satisfies the threshold causation requirement. Zupon v. Industrial 
Commission, 860 P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1993). 
In considering the issue of causation, the Commission notes 
the Social Security Administration's determination that Mr. Hansen 
was disabled from work after the 1976 injury. However, the 
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Commission does not know the underlying facts upon which the Social 
Security Administration made its award, whether those facts are 
supported by the evidence, or whether legal principles appropriate 
to workers' compensation were applied by the Social Security 
Administration in making its determination. For those reasons, the 
Commission does not place a great deal of reliance on the Social 
Security determination.1 
The Commission also notes that Mr. Hansen received a 16% 
permanent partial impairment rating as a result of the 197 6 
accident. That impairment rating has never changed since his 
industrial injury. It is insufficient to prove that the 1976 
accident caused Mr. Hansen to be permanently and totally disabled. 
Finally, the Commission notes that Mr. Hansen did not actually 
return to work after the 1976 accident. However, his failure to 
return to work may be attributable to reasons other than his injury 
and is therefore given little weight. 
Other facts exist which indicate Mr. Hansen's 1976 accident 
did not cause permanent total disability. Mr. Hansen's treating 
physician released him to return to light duty work during 1977. 
Mr. Hansen filed two claims for workers' compensation benefits 
within a few years of the 197 6 accident and thus was before the 
Commission twice, but neither time did he claim to be permanently 
and totally disabled. Shortly after his 1976 accident, Mr. Hansen 
began suffering pulmonary problems then other assorted medical 
problems, which have been appraised by a medical panel as much more 
significant and debilitating than his industrial injury. 
As noted above, Mr. Hansen claims that his 197 6 industrial 
injury caused permanent total disability as of 1976. The fact that 
Mr. Hansen waited 14 years to raise his claim does not reduce his 
burden of proof, or shift that burden of proof to his employer. 
Had he raised his claim earlier, both parties could have provided 
better evidence. Be that is it may, the Commission must make its 
decision based on the evidence that is available now. In view of 
the record before it, the Commission concludes that Mr. Hansen has 
failed to prove his 1976 industrial injury caused his now-claimed 
permanent total disability. 
While the current version of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 specifically refers to the "sequential 
decision making process of the Social Security Administration", no such provision existed in Utah 
law at the time of Mr. Hansen's injury. 
Gerald R. Hansen 
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ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission denies Mr. Hansen's 
claim for permanent total disability compensation. It is so 
ordered. 
Dated this /?) day of May, 1994. 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 2 0 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition 
For Review with that Court within 3 0 days of the date of this 
Order. 
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Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc. 571 P.2d 1368, 1369-70 
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dismissing case for failure to prosecute when party's 
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9. Nothing prevents the trial court from receiving 
additional memoranda if it wishes to do so. We 
merely hold that Hartford was not entided to submit 
the additional memorandum as a matter of right. 
Hartford may have been more successful in gaining 
acceptance of its supplemental memorandum if it had 
first sought leave of court. Counsel could have filed 
a motion, stating the reasons the information was not 
included in the original memorandum, and requested 
permission to submit an additional memorandum. Cf. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(d) (motion to allow supplemental 
pleadings, at discretion of court); Utah R. Civ. P. 
60(b)(1), (2) (motion for relief from judgment for 
excusable neglect or newly discovered evidence); Utah 
Code Jud. Admin. R4-501(l)(a) (over-length 
memorandum may be submitted with prior leave of 
court on ex parte application). 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
COMMERCIAL CARRIERS and Old 
Republic Insurance, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Utah, and Ronny Lyn Judd, 
Respondents. 
of 
No. 940208-CA 
FILED: December 30, 1994 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
ATTORNEYS: 
Anne Swensen and Juliana e P. Blanch, Salt 
Lake City, for Petitioners 
Eugene C. Miller, Jr., Salt Lake City, for 
Respondents 
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Petitioners Commercial Carriers (Commercial) 
and its insurer, Old Republic Insurance, seek 
reversal of a decision by the Board of Review of 
the Utah Industrial Commission (the Board) 
granting worker's compensation benefits to 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
(Judd), a truck driver wno was injureu m a ngui 
at a truck stop motel. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
On May 21, 1992, Commercial assigned Judd 
and fellow trucker, Jim Coyle (Coyle), to 
transport a truck load of automobiles from 
Wentzville, Missouri, to Burlingame, California. 
The two men stopped for the night at a motel in 
Fort Kearney, Nebraska. They spent several 
hours drinking in the motel bar. After the bar 
closed, Judd and Coyle encountered two men in 
the parking lot near their trucks. Judd and Coyle 
told the men to stay away from their trucks, and 
the two men fled into a field. Judd and Coyle 
pursued the two men into the field, where Judd 
was severely beaten by one of the men. 
When Commercial refused Judd's request for 
worker's compensation benefits, Judd petitioned 
the Utah Industrial Commission for a hearing on 
his claim. After a hearing, the adrninistrative 
law judge (ALT) found that Judd and Coyle met 
two women who joined them at the bar to escape 
the "harassment" of two younger men, who had 
asked the women to dance. The ALJ ultimately 
found that the fight that caused Judd's injuries 
resulted from personal animosity between Judd 
and the two younger men "who were competing 
for the attention" of the two women. 
Accordingly, the ALJ dismissed Judd's claim 
with prejudice. 
Judd appealed to the Board. Although the 
Board adopted most of the ALJ's findings of 
fact, it drew different "inferences" from those 
facts. The Board found that Judd and Coyle met 
the women at the bar and walked them to their 
car when the bar closed. After the women drove 
away, the two young men who had been in the 
bar suggested to Judd and Coyle that the four of 
them buy more beer and drink it in their motel 
room. The truckers declined, stating they had to 
leave early in the morning. 
The Board found that, during the 
conversation, the young men also asked if they 
could take one of the cars Judd and Coyle were 
transporting out for a drive. Judd told the young 
men such use was prohibited and warned them 
that all of the cars had alarms. 
The Board further found that Judd and Coyle 
then left the young men and walked to the 
parking lot to check their trucks. Afterward, 
they walked to a nearby convenience store, but 
the store was closed. As they were walking back 
to the motel, they observed the two young men 
in the parking lot, walking around the parked 
cars and trucks. Judd and Coyle walked toward 
their trucks and watched the young men from 
the shadows. 
The young men then approached Judd's and 
Coyle's trucks, and one said, "[T]hese must be 
the vehicles with the alarms." At that point, 
Judd and Coyle confronted the young men and 
told them to stay away from their trucks and all 
other trucks in the parking lot. 
The two young men nea .into me uciu, mm 
Judd and Coyle walked after them.. About thirty 
yards into the field, the young men stopped. 
One of them beat Judd, who suffered serious 
injuries. 
Based on those findings, the Board reversed 
the ALJ's decision and awarded worker's 
compensation benefits to Judd. The Board 
concluded that although the women at the bar 
joined Judd and Coyle in part to "avoid the 
attentions of the two younger men," there was 
"no objective evidence" to support the 
"hypothesis" that the fight stemmed from 
antagonism concerning the two women. Thus, 
the Board concluded that the fight and Judd's 
injuries "arose out of and in the course o f 
Judd's employment. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Commercial raises two issues on appeal: 
(1) Did the Board correctly determine that 
Judd's injuries arose out of and in the course of 
his employment under Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 
(1988)? 
(2) Did the Board err in allowing Judd an 
extension of time to appeal the AU's denial of 
benefits without a showing of good cause? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review the Board's findings of fact under 
section 63-46b-16(4)(g) of the Utah Code, which 
provides that a factual finding may be disturbed 
only if it "is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court." Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989); King v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 
1993). We review an agency's interpretation and 
application of statutes for correctness, unless the 
statute in question grants the agency discretion. 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of State Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588-89 (Utah 1991). 
Because section 35-1-45 of the Utah Code, 
which states that compensable injuries must 
"arise out of and in the course of employment," 
grants no discretion, we review the Board's 
decisions for correctness. Walls v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 857 P.2d 964, 966-67 (Utah App. 
1993) ("[S]ection 35-1-45 (1988) does not 
expressly or impliedly grant the Commission 
discretion to interpret or apply the language of 
that section."). 
ANALYSIS 
Commercial makes three main arguments on 
appeal. First, Commercial argues that the 
Board's findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence and, thus, should be reversed. Second, 
Commercial claims that the Board erred in 
concludmg Judd's injuries were work-related. 
Finally, Commercial argues that it was 
substantially prejudiced by the Board's decision 
to grant Judd an extension of time to appeal the 
ALJ's order. We consider each of these 
arguments m turn. 
Commercial claims the Board's findings of 
fact are not supported by "substantial evidence," 
as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989).1 Commercial argues 
that the Board cannot reverse the ALJ's findings 
of fact without stating specifically and in detail 
the reasons for doing so. We disagree. 
"While it is the ALJ who initially hears the 
evidence, the Commission is the ultimate fact 
finder." Chose v. Industrial Comm'n, 872 P.2d 
475, 479 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Virgin v. 
Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 803 P.2d 
1284, 1287 (Utah App. 1990)); see also U.S. 
Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 607 P.2d 
807, 810-11 (Utah 1980) (holding that Industrial 
Commission is ultimate fact finder). Moreover, 
Professor Arthur Larson, in his treatise on 
worker's compensation, notes that the decisions 
of the Board, not the ALJ, are deemed 
conclusive in the majority of states,2 3 Arthur 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 
§80.12(b) (1994). 
We therefore review the record before us to 
determine if substantial evidence supports the 
Board's factual findings. Substantial evidence is 
more than a "'scintilla' of evidence," though 
"iess than the weight of the evidence.'" Grace 
Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 
(Utah App. 1989) (citation omitted), superseded 
on other grounds, 819 P.2d 361 (1991). 
Substantial evidence is that quantum and quality 
of relevant evidence that will convince a 
reasonable mind to support a conclusion. First 
Nat'I Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 
P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). To determine 
whether a finding is supported by substantial 
evidence, we examine the record as a whole, 
weighing evidence that both supports and 
detracts from the finding. Grace Drilling, 776 
P.2d at 68. 
Commercial argues that the Board must 
explain its reasons for making different findings 
than the ALJ. Commercial claims that this 
court's decision in Adams v. Board of Review of 
the Indus. Comm'n, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 
1991), requires the Board to adequately detail 
the logic behind a factual finding so that it may 
be challenged on appeal. Id. at 5 (the Board's 
findings "'should be sufficiently detailed to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual 
conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and 
law, are reached.'") (quoting Milne Truck Lines, 
Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1373, 
1378 (Utah 1986)). 
However, Commercial's reliance on Adams is 
misplaced. In Adams, a worker at a 
telemarketing firm claimed a variety of injuries 
stemming from her work, which required 
constant use of the telephone without a headset 
or automatic dialing equipment. Id. at 3. The 
ALJ reviewed conflicting medical testimony 
from doctors and mental health professionals, 
some of whom thought her injuries were 
work-related, while others did not. Id. at 3-4. 
The ALJ ultimately denied benefits after 
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The Industrial Commission affirmed the decision 
with a single "finding," stating simply that the 
injury was not work-related. Id. at 5. This court 
vacated the Commission's order, holding that 
the finding was "arbitrary" because it was so 
inadequate that it defied meaningful review. Id. 
at 7; see Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) 
(1990). Thus, the question addressed by the 
Adams court was not whether the findings were 
supported by substantial evidence, but rather 
whether the findings sufficiently disclosed the 
logical process employed to permit meaningful 
review. 
By contrast, the findings in the instant case are 
sufficiently detailed to meet the Adams test. The 
Board's findings consist of thirteen paragraphs 
carefully detailing the events leading to Judd's 
injuries.3 The Board's findings are sufficiently 
detailed that we can discern the Board's logical 
process; i.e., subsidiary fact findings logically 
lead to ultimate fact findings. 
Moreover, our review of the record indicates 
there was substantial evidence to support the 
Board's findings. The Board found that Judd and 
Coyle spent several hours in the motel lounge, 
during which time they encountered two women, 
one of whom was an acquaintance of Judd's. 
Further, the Board found that, "to some 
degree," the women joined Judd and Coyle to 
avoid the two younger men. Nonetheless, the 
Board found that the young men later suggested 
that Judd and Coyle join them for more beer 
after the bar closed. The young men also asked 
if they could drive one of the cars Judd and 
Coyle were transporting, but Judd told them it 
was not allowed. After leaving the bar, Judd and 
Coyle walked to the parking lot to check their 
trucks. A short time later, Judd and Coyle 
observed the two young men approach their 
trucks and overheard one of the young men say, 
M[T]hese must be the vehicles with the alarms." 
Judd and Coyle confronted the two men, who 
fled into the field. The two truckers pursued the 
young men about thirty yards into the field, and 
Judd was severely injured. 
"It is the province of the Board, not appellate 
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and 
where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from 
the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw 
the inferences." Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68. 
Thus, the inference that Judd's injuries were 
job-related is clearly within the Board's 
fact-finding authority. 
II. Work-related Injuries 
Having ruled on the adequacy and 
substantiality of the factual findings, we turn 
next to the question of whether these facts 
establish that Judd's injuries "arose out of and in 
the course of his employment."4 
The Board found Judd's injuries "arose out 
of" his employment. We agree. Injuries are 
deemed to arise out of employment when there 
is a "causal relationship" between the injury and 
the employment. M & K Corp. v. Industrial 
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of" employment is not synonymous with "caused 
by" employment; rather, the cause of the injury 
"is something other than the employment; the 
employment is thought of more as a condition 
out of which the event arises than as the force 
producing the event in affirmative fashion." 1 
Larson, supra, §6.60, at 3-9 (emphasis in 
original). Moreover, "[t]he controlling test 
should be 'if the circumstances of the 
employment can be fairly said to have elicited 
conduct by the employee which results in his 
injury.'" Id. §11.11(c), at 3-205 (citation 
omitted). Accordingly, when the injuries result 
from a fight, the injuries may still be causally 
related to the employment "[i]f the fight is 
spontaneous and closely entangled with the work 
itself." Id. §11.15(a), at 3-243. Because Judd 
was injured while attempting to protect his 
cargo, we conclude that the fight was "closely 
entangled" with his job as a truck driver for 
Commercial. Thus, we concur with the Board's 
conclusion that Judd's injury arose out of his 
employment by Commercial.5 
We also agree with the Board's conclusion 
that Judd's injuries arose "in the course of" his 
employment. An accident arises in the course of 
employment when "it occurs while the employee 
is rendering service to his employer which he 
was hired to do or doing something incidental 
thereto, at the time when and the place where he 
was authorized to render such service." M & K 
Corp., 189 P.2d at 134. Additionally, an injury 
arises in the course of employment if it occurs 
within the "time, place and circumstances" of 
the employment. Walls v. Industrial Comm'n, 
857 P.2d 964, 967 (Utah App. 1993); see 1 
Larson, supra, §14.00. 
Commercial argues that Judd's injuries are not 
compensable because they were suffered during 
a personal deviation from work. Commercial 
relies upon Walls, in which this court held that 
a bartender who was injured while helping move 
a beer keg several hours after her scheduled 
shift was not entitled to compensation. Walls, 
857 P.2d at 966. 
However, Walls is distinguishable because it 
involves an employee who was injured following 
a clear break from her employment 
responsibilities. -Here, Judd, in his capacity as a 
truck driver for Commercial, had genera] 
working hours in that he could drive for ten 
hours or 540 miles a day. After stopping in Fori 
Kearney for the evening, Judd and Coyle 
decided to relax and drink beer for several hours 
in the motel lounge. Nonetheless, when the ba] 
closed, the two checked their trucks in order t< 
ensure the cargo was safe. When the} 
discovered the two young men milling aroun< 
the trucks, Judd and Coyle chased them away. 
Judd's injuries were a direct result of his attemp 
to protect his cargo, not a personal deviatio 
from work. 
Moreover, it is reasonable that an employe 
should feel some responsibility to protect his 0 
her employer's property. See Martinez v. 
Workers' Comp. App. Bd., 544 P.2d 1350,1352 
(Cal. 1976) (church worker who was injured 
while attempting to prevent theft of beer from 
his employer is entitled to worker's 
compensation). In this case, it was reasonable 
that Judd would attempt to preempt potential 
vandals rather than simply notifying police after 
the vandalism had occurred. Judd's concerns 
about the intentions of the two young men were 
especially understandable in light of the interest 
the young men had expressed in taking one of 
the cars for a "joy ride." 
Accordingly, we conclude that the Board did 
not err in determining Judd's injuries "arose out 
of and in the course of his employment." Also, 
Judd was responsible for delivering his cargo 
safely to its ultimate destination. That job was 
necessarily punctuated by rest stops, but those 
stops did not terminate his duty to protect the 
cargo from harm. 
III. Judd's Motion for Review 
Commercial argues that the Board erred in 
granting Judd a thirty-day extension of time to 
appeal the A U ' s ruling without requiring Judd 
to show good cause for the extension. See Utah 
Code Ann. §63^6b-l(9) (1989) ("Nothing in 
this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a 
presiding officer, for good cause shown, from 
lengthening or shortening any time period 
prescribed in this chapter"). Moreover, 
Commercial argues that this court should reverse 
under Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) 
(1989), which requires reversal if a party has 
been substantially prejudiced by an action that is 
contrary to the agency's prior practice. 
Commercial cites Maverik Country Stores v. 
Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah 
App. 1993), as support for this argument. 
We find Commercial's argument unpersuasive. 
First, Maverik is distinguishable because the 
request for an extension was filed after the 
deadline. Id. at 946. Conversely, Judd filed his 
request for a continuance one day before the 
cut-off. Second, Commercial did not claim in its 
motion opposing the extension that it would be 
substantially prejudiced by an extension. Utah 
Code Ann. §63^6b-16(4)(h)(iii). Without a 
showing of substantial prejudice, Commercial's 
motion was without merit. Moreover, a claim of 
substantial prejudice would be unavailing to 
Commercial because the test for substantial 
prejudice is not, as Commercial claims, the fact 
that it received an unfavorable result; rather, the 
test is whether Commercial was given full and 
fair consideration of the issues. See Ashton v. 
Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987). There 
is nothing to indicate the Board failed to fully 
and fairly consider Commercial's position. 
Thus, there was no prejudicial error. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the Board's factual findings 
concerning the circumstances of Judd's injuries 
were supported by substantial evidence. 
Although some of the Board's findings were a 
odds with those of the ALJ, the. Board is th< 
ultimate fact finder, and it was within it 
authority in adopting different findings. Further 
we find the Board was correct in concluding tha 
Judd's injuries "arose out of and in the cours 
o f his employment for Commercial. Hi 
injuries were, as the Board ruled, "closel. 
entangled" with his work responsibilities. W< 
also find it reasonable that Judd acted to protec 
his employer's property. Finally, we conclud 
that Commercial's claim that the Boar 
committed prejudicial error by granting 
thirty-day extension to Judd for challenging th 
ALJ's ruling is without merit. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. In challenging the Board's factual findings, a par 
is required to marshal all of the evidence in support < 
the Board's findings, then demonstrate that t\ 
findings are not supported by substantial evidenc 
Johnson v. Board of Review, 842 P.2d 910,912 (Ut 
App. 1992). In the instant case, Commercial's effoi 
at marshalling the evidence fall short of th 
requirement. In effect, Commercial selective 
presented those findings that support its position ai 
omitted findings that support Judd's position. F 
example, Commercial did not mention that the t\ 
young men suggested that Judd and Coyle join the 
for more beer drinking after the lounge close 
Commercial also failed to state that Judd and Co) 
had checked their trucks after leaving the bar. Tl 
evidence is important because it tends to support t 
Board's findings that the fight and Judd's injur 
resulted not from personal antipathy, but from Jud« 
attempt to safeguard his cargo. 
2. Only seven states—Florida, Pennsylvan 
Oklahoma, Arizona, Michigan, Colorado, a 
Kentucky—and the Longshoreman's Act attach 
presumption of conclusiveness to the ALJ's 
referee's findings. 3 Arthur Larson, Workme, 
Compensation Law §80.12(c)(l)-(8) (1994). 
3. Although it is not incumbent on the Board, as i 
ultimate fact finder, to explain its reasons 
reversing the ALJ, we note that the Board nonethel 
states that it simply finds no "objective evidence 
support" the^hypothesis that Judd's beating resul 
from a fight over women rather than a fight over 
truck and cars." 
4. As Professor Larson notes, the "arising out o r ; 
the "in the course" of provisions are usually regar 
as separate legal tests, each of which must be i 
before compensation can be awarded. 1 Lars 
supra, §6 10, at 3-3. This would appear to be the c 
in Utah, which at one time was, according to Lars 
the only state in which a worker was awar 
compensation for an injury "arising out of or in 
course of employment." Id. at 3-2 (citing Utah C 
Ann. §35-1-45 (1953)) (emphasis added). The sta 
has since been amended to state that compens. 
injuries are those "arising out of and in the cours 
his employment." Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 (lc 
(emphasis added). 
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factual findings underlying the Board's conclusion on 
this point, it does not attack the legal conclusion itself. 
Thus, we need not consider it further. 
6. Commercial argues that by confronting the two 
men and chasing them into the field, Judd violated 
company rules, which require a trucker to 
immediately report vandalism to the police. However, 
this contention was directly contradicted by testimony 
of Commercial's terminal manager, who told the ALJ 
that "I don't believe that we have ever instructed" 
truckers what to do when someone is only attempting 
to vandalize their trucks. 
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ORME, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Alicia Larson appeals the trial court's order 
modifying the child custody and visitation 
provisions of a divorce decree. She also 
challenges the trial court's decision not to award 
her costs and attorney fees incurred in contesting 
the modification of the divorce decree initiated 
by her ex-husband. We reverse the trial court's 
ruling modifying the divorce decree, but affirm 
its decision not to award costs and attorney fees. 
FACTS 
After nine years of marriage, Alicia and 
Marc Larson were divorced on April 29, 1992. 
The marriage produced three children, the oldest 
of whom was eight and the youngest of whom 
was five at the time the court modified the 
divorce decree. Prior to her marriage, Alicia 
During the marriage and at the time oi uic 
divorce, Alicia was a homemaker, not otherwise 
employed outside the home, and Marc owned 
and operated a physical therapy clinic in Park 
City, Utah. 
The decree of divorce incorporated the parties' 
stipulation and property settlement agreement 
and provided, in part, that Marc and Alicia 
maintain joint legal custody of the children, with 
physical custody to be with Alicia. Marc was 
awarded extensive rights of visitation, including 
two-and-one-half weekends per month, extended 
summer visits, and an equal share of time with 
the children during the holidays. 
The parties were ordered to cooperate in 
fostering and maintaining each other's 
relationship with their children and to inform 
one another of important issues in the children's 
lives to facilitate joint decision-making. 
Consistent with this general mandate was the 
specific requirement that each party was to give 
the other a minimum of thirty days written 
notice prior to relocating from the Park City 
area. 
The parties and their children have lived in 
Park City since 1989. Alicia and the children 
continued to reside together in Park City 
following the divorce, as did Marc in a separate 
home. In the summer of 1992, Alicia attended a 
workshop in Oregon to receive instruction in 
glass fusion, an advanced form of stained-glass 
art. During this workshop, Alicia met Doug 
Pomeroy, a glass fusion artist and an instructor 
at the workshop. Subsequently, Alicia and Doug 
made plans to marry and thereafter live together 
with the Larson children in Doug's home in 
Corvallis, Oregon. In October 1992, Alicia 
notified Marc, by letter, that she intended to 
marry Doug Pomeroy and move to Corvallis 
with the children. 
On November 6, 1992, Marc filed a petition 
to modify the custody provisions of the divorce 
decree. Marc filed the petition because he was 
concerned that the move to Oregon would not be 
in the children's best interest, as it would inhibit 
his ability to maintain a parental relationship 
with his children, disrupt their religious training, 
and remove them from their friends and 
relatives. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court granted Marc'-s* petition to modify the 
divorce decree. The court found that it was in 
the best interests of the children to remain in the 
Park City area and ordered that if Alicia moved 
from Summit County, Utah, physical custody of 
the children would thereupon be transferred to 
Marc, and Alicia would then have reasonable 
and liberal rights of visitation. The trial court 
also determined that the parties had the ability to 
pay their own costs and attorney fees. 
Alicia Larson appeals, raising the following 
issues: (1) Was there sufficient evidence to 
support the trial court's findings? (2) Did the 
trial court abuse its discretion in granting Marc's 
petition to modify? (3) Did the trial court abuse 
its discretion in failing to award costs and 
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question of whether the officers acted in an 
objectively reasonable manner in reliance 
on the search warrant. At the very least, 
the trial court should be invited to deter-
mine factually if the officer knew that in-
formation he supplied in the affidavit was 
false, or whether he "would have known 
[it] was false except for his reckless disre-
gard of the truth." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 
104 S.Ct. at 3421. 
After we have decided the narrow issue 
presented in an interlocutory appeal, we 
should allow the case to proceed in the trial 
court "To the extent an appellate court 
supersedes the trial court in the decision of 
factual issues and the application of law to 
fact, it undermines the authority of the 
tribunals through which the legal system 
speaks directly to those who invoke the 
legal process for resolution of their contro-
versies." Section 3.11, American Bar Asso-
ciation, Standards Relating to Appellate 
Courts, 1977 Edition. We must be very 
careful not to usurp the authority and re-
sponsibility of our trial courts. 
Due to the intermediate and limited na-
ture of this appeal, I would reverse the 
suppression order and remand the case for 
further proceedings in the trial court. 
John W. ZUPON, Petitioner, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund; Unin-
sured Employers' Fund; and Kaiser 
Steel Corporation, Respondents. 
No. 920569-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sept 14, 1993. 
Workers' compensation claimant 
sought review of Industrial Commission's 
decision denying his claim for permanent 
total disability benefits. The Court of Ap-
peals, Billings, P.J., held that Commission? 
decision was supported by substantial evi-
dence. 
Affirmed. 
1. Workers* Compensation 3=>1856 
Failure of workers' compensation 
claimant to raise claim that he was entitled 
to compensation for an additional 50% per-
manent partial disability at original hearing 
precluded any review of such claim on ap-
peal. 
2. Workers' Compensation @=>1937 
Industrial Commission's comment, that 
administrative law judge's findings were 
supported by substantial evidence, repre-
sented at most harmless error since sub-
stantial evidence standard was simply recit-
ed in response to an unclear nonspecific 
challenge and the substantive, factual dis-
cussion of the case applied the necessary 
preponderance of the evidence standard. 
3. Workers' Compensation @=»847 
"Odd lot doctrine" allows Industrial 
Commission to find permanent total disabil-
ity when relatively small percentage of im-
pairment caused by industrial accident is 
combined with other factors to render 
claimant unable to obtain employment. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Workers' Compensation <3=>847 
To qualify as recipient of benefits un-
der odd lot doctrine, employee must prove 
that she can no longer perform duties re-
quired in her occupation and must estab-
lish, through cooperation with Division of 
Vocational Rehabilitation, that she cannot 
be rehabilitated. 
5. Workers' Compensation ®=>847 
After employee seeking benefits under 
odd lot doctrine has shown that rehabilita-
tion is not possible, employer has opportu-
nity to prove existence of steady work that 
employee can perform; the work the em-
ployer establishes is available must take 
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consideration all relevant factors, in-
ng employee's education, mental ca-
and age, as well as physical limita-
Workers' Compensation ®=>1421 
Before workers' compensation claim-
nt can acquire benefits under the odd lot 
ne, claimant must establish compen-
ble industrial injury by preponderance of 
evidence. 
|i Workers' Compensation «=»1492 
Proving medical causation between in-
lustrial accident and disability for which 
orkers' compensation claimant seeks com-
ation is necessary component for re-
pvery. 
Workers' Compensation @=>1716, 1939.-
11(5) 
Medical causation is issue of fact and 
ourt of Appeals reviews this determina-
on of Industrial Commission under sub-
otial evidence standard. U.C.A.1953, 
[63-46b-16(4)(g). 
Workers' Compensation <s»847 
For odd lot doctrine to apply, Industri-
e s Commission had to determine that there 
j*yas medical causation between claimant's 
[industrial accident and his claimed perma-
it "total" disability and this issue was 
•t controlled by administrative law 
fudge's (ALT) determination approximately 
15 years earlier that claimant's industrial 
ident caused permanent 'partial" dis-
and AU's determination that there 
medical causation did not prevent Com-
ion from reaching different conclusion 
[*years later based on new medical evi-
nce. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-78(1). 
It Workers' Compensation <s=>1636 
^Substantial evidence supported Indus-
Commission's determination that 
leers' compensation claimant did not es-
blish that his industrial accident was 
iical cause of his claimed total perma-
Qt disability. 
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Before BENCH, BILLINGS and ORME, 
JJ. 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
John W. Zupon filed this Petition for 
Review from an order of the Industrial 
Commission denying his claim for perma-
nent total disability benefits. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
In 1975, petitioner was employed by Kai-
ser Steel as an electrician. On August 7 of 
that year, he felt a pain in his back while 
lifting an acetylene tank at work. In Feb-
ruary of 1977, an administrative law judge 
found petitioner had a ten percent perma-
nent physical impairment and was entitled 
to twenty-six weeks of temporary total 
compensation and thirty-one weeks of per-
manent partial compensation. The ALJ 
based his ruling on the opinion of a medical 
panel which found petitioner had total 
physical impairment of sixty percent. The 
panel, however, found only ten percent of 
the total physical impairment attributable 
to the industrial accident. It attributed the 
balance of petitioner's impairment to a 
preexisting condition known as ankylosing-
spondylitis, a degenerative disease of the 
spine. The panel concluded the ten percent 
impairment was attributable to the indus-
trial accident because there was "a one-in-
six chance that the ankylosingspondylitis 
was aggravated by the lumbar back strain 
on the basis of the progression of the x-ray 
changes." 
In June of 1976, petitioner applied for 
social security disability benefits. His ini-
tial application, application for a rehearing, 
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and application on appeal were all denied. 
Following a court order obtained to acquire 
review of unspecified new evidence, peti-
tioner had a new hearing in May of 1978. 
In June of 1978, the Social Security Admin-
istration's ALT granted petitioner benefits. 
The ALJ ruled petitioner's total disability 
was not a result of his back problems but 
rather a result of arthritis in his hands that 
became more severe starting in January of 
1977. A doctor who assessed petitioner in 
1981 to determine whether his Social Secu-
rity benefits should continue noted: "I 
think this patient's symptoms are way out 
of proportion to the objective findings 
which are presented." 
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed an ap-
plication for permanent total disability 
based on his 1975 accident. A hearing was 
held and the ALT concluded petitioner had 
failed to establish the necessary medical 
causation between his 1975 industrial acci-
dent and his permanent total disability. 
The ALJ based her conclusion on two ratio-
nales: First, the medical evidence demon-
1. In his reply brief, petitioner challenges, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12(6)(c) (1989), the 
sufficiency of the Industrial Commission's find-
ings of fact in its order denying review. We 
note the facts in this case are undisputed and in 
such a case the failure to disclose a specific 
subsidiary finding is not fatal to the agency's 
decision. See Adams v. Board of Review, 821 
P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App.1991). Although we do not 
remand here because of the nature of the rec-
ord, we strongly encourage the Industrial Com-
mission to clearly articulate its factual findings 
in all cases to enhance our ability "to conduct a 
meaningful review." Id. at 4. 
2. Petitioner also argues the Commission erred 
when it rejected his claim, made for the first 
time in his Motion for Review, that he deserved 
compensation for an additional fifty percent 
permanent partial disability. The application 
for a hearing does not specify such a claim. 
The ALJ, in a response letter, indicates that such 
a claim was not presented at the hearing. Al-
though the Commission rejected the claim based 
on the eight year statute of limitations which 
had expired more than seven years before peti-
tioner raised this claim in his motion for re-
view, we do not consider Mr. Zupon's claim 
because his failure to raise the claim at the 
original hearing precludes any review on ap-
peal. See Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm'n, 855 
P.2d 267, 268-69 (Utah App.1993). 
3. Petitioner also claims we should remand the 
case for factual findings because the Commis-
strated it was petitioner's arthritic condi-
tion, which was unrelated to the industrial 
injury, that caused petitioner's inability to 
work; Second, even if ankylosingspondyli-
tis contributed to petitioner's inability to 
work, the industrial accident did not cause 
the disease and "only questionably aggra-
vated i t " 
On August 3, 1992, the Industrial Com-
mission issued an order affirming the 
AU's order and denying petitioner's mo-
tion for review. Petitioner brings a peti-
tion for review to this court from the Com-
mission's order.1 
[1,2] On appeal, petitioner argues the 
Commission erred by failing to apply the 
"odd lot" doctrine to his situation and 
award him permanent total disability bene-
fits.2 Petitioner further claims the Com-
mission's determination of no medical cau-
sation was contrary to its prior determina-
tion of ten percent causation and therefore 
in error.3 The Commission responds that 
sion applied the substantial evidence test rather 
than a preponderance of the evidence standard. 
See Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267, 
269 (Utah App.1993). In Ashcroft, the Industrial 
Commission held petitioner had failed to meet 
his burden of proof under the substantial evi-
dence standard. Furthermore, the only evalua-
tion of the evidence the Commission did was 
under the substantial evidence standard. We 
noted substantial evidence review is not the role 
of the Commission, a trier of fact. Id. 
The case at hand is significantly different. 
Here, the Commission ruled the ALJ's findings 
were supported by substantial evidence. The 
order found the respondents had established no 
medical causation by "substantial evidence." 
This is the exact opposite of Ashcroft. A sub-
stantial evidence standard represents a higher 
burden of proof and thus the comment repre-
sents at most a harmless error. 
Furthermore, in the order denying review, the 
Commission systematically responded directly 
to the challenges the petitioner asserted to the 
ALJ's findings. In response to the petitioner's 
challenge that the ALJ improperly found no 
medical causation, the Commission recited the 
evidence supporting medical causation and con-
cluded "the medical records do not establish a 
medical causal connection between applicant's 
August 7, 1975 industrial injury and his perma-
nent total disability." As opposed to Ashcroft, 
where substantial evidence was the only com-
ment on the evidence by the Commission, in 
this case the substantial evidence standard is 
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the odd lot doctrine is inapplicable because 
medical causation must be established prior 
to the doctrine's application and the Com-
mission properly found petitioner's indus-
trial injury did not cause his permanent 
total disability. 
ODD LOT DOCTRINE 
[3-5] The odd lot doctrine "allows the 
Commission to find permanent total disabil-
ity when a relatively small percentage of 
impairment caused by an industrial acci-
dent is combined with other factors to ren-
der the claimant unable to obtain employ-
ment." Zimmerman v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah App. 
1989). See also Marshall v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 681 P.2d 208, 212-13 (Utah 1984) 
(discussing odd lot doctrine). To qualify as 
a recipient of benefits under the odd lot 
doctrine, an employee must first "prove 
that he or she can no longer perform the 
duties required in his or her occupation." 
Zimmerman, 785 P.2d at 1131. Next, the 
employee, through cooperation with the Di-
vision of Vocational Rehabilitation, must 
"establish that he or she cannot be rehabili-
tated." Id. After the employee has shown 
that rehabilitation is not possible, the em-
ployer has the opportunity "to prove the 
existence of steady work the employee can 
perform." Id. The work the employer es-
tablishes is available must take into consid-
eration all relevant factors "including the 
employee's education, mental capacity, and 
age" as well as physical limitations. Id.4 
[6,7] Before a claimant can acquire 
benefits under the odd lot doctrine, howev-
er, the claimant must establish a compensa-
ble industrial injury. Zimmerman, 785 
^2d at 1132. " '[U]nless the claimant has 
suffered a compensable industrial injury, 
Ihe [odd lot] doctrine is inapplicable no 
iaatter how compelling the other factors.'" 
&^ (quoting Ortiz v. Industrial Comm'n, 
'%*£•" 
jf*simply recited in response to an unclear nonspe-
j^cific challenge. The substantive, factual discus-
vision of the case applies the necessary prepon-
derance of the evidence standard. 
m 
4. Although petitioner argues that application of 
I -the odd lot analysis indicates he is entitled to 
benefits, it is clear from the record there was, at 
766 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Utah App.1989)) (modi-
fications in original). The claimant must 
prove the compensability of an injury by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Ashcroft 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267, 269 
(Utah App. 1993). Proving medical causa-
tion between the industrial accident and the 
disability for which the claimant seeks com-
pensation is a necessary component for re-
covery. Allen v. Industrial Comm 'n, 729 
P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986). 
MEDICAL CAUSATION 
[8] Medical causation is an issue of fact 
and we review the determination of the 
Industrial Commission under the substan-
tial evidence standard. See King v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah 
App.1993); Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4)(g) (1989). "Medical causation de-
mands that petitioner 'prove [his] disability 
is medically the result of an exertion or 
injury that occurred during a work-related 
activity.'" Willardson v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 856 P.2d 371, 375 (Utah App. 
1993) (quoting Allen v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986)) 
(footnote omitted). 
Petitioner claims the Commission com-
mitted error in ignoring its prior decision 
that ten percent of petitioner's permanent 
partial impairment was attributable to the 
industrial accident. This argument misap-
prehends the impact of the Commission's 
earlier decision. 
[9] For the odd-lot doctrine to apply, 
the Commission must first determine there 
is medical causation between the petition-
er's 1975 industrial accident and his now 
claimed permanent total disability. That 
is a different question from, and not con-
trolled in any way by, the determination 
that his industrial accident caused a perma-
nent partial disability. Furthermore, the 
determination that there was medical cau-
the very least, never any rehabilitation evalua-
tion ordered. See Hardman v. Salt Lake City 
Fleet Management, 725 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Utah 
1986) (remanding for rehabilitation determina-
tion). See also Norton v. Industrial Comm'n, 
728 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) 
(remanding to 2^scss disability and provide em-
ployer opportunity to prove existence of work). 
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sation in the 1977 hearing did not prevent 
the Commission from reaching a different 
conclusion based on new medical evidence 
at the 1992 hearing. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-78(1) (Supp.1993). While the 1977 
decision was some evidence supporting 
medical causation for the new permanent 
total claim brought sixteen years after the 
industrial accident, the A U and the Com-
mission properly reassessed all the medical 
evidence in the record. 
[10] Based primarily on the Social Secu-
rity Administration's determination that pe-
titioner's total disability was a result of the 
arthritis in the petitioner's hands, the Com-
mission found there was no medical causa-
tion between the 1975 industrial injury and 
his permanent total disability claim.5 
Thus, the Commission's determination peti-
tioner did not establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the 1975 industrial 
accident was a medical cause of his now 
claimed total permanent disability is sup-
ported by substantial, undisputed evidence 
in the record. We therefore affirm. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission's determina-
tion that petitioner failed to establish his 
1977 industrial injury was a medical cause 
of his now claimed permanent total disabili-
ty is supported by substantial evidence. 
We therefore affirm the denial of perma-
nent total disability benefits. 
ORME and BENCH, JJ., concur. 
5. The AU and the Commission discussed an 
alternative basis for the rejection of petitioner's 
claim. Based on the medical panel's assessment 
that there was only a one-in-six chance petition-
er's back injury aggravated his spine disease, the 
ALT questioned the validity of the earlier AU's 
finding of medical causation. The AU noted a 
one-in-six, or 16 and 66 one-hundredths percent, 
chance is significantly less than the 50 percent 
required under the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard. Furthermore, the AU explicit-
ly and completely reviewed the substantial, un-
disputed medical evidence in the case. The 
Commission also affirmed the AU's finding of 
no medical causation on this basis and recited 
The PROMARK GROUP, INC., a Colora-
do corporation formerly known as 
Component Sales, Inc., and Utah Com-
ponent Sales, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
HARRIS CORPORATION, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 920173-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sept. 17, 1993. 
Sales representative sued corporation 
seeking to recover damages for lost com-
missions and lost value of exclusive sales 
territory due to improper termination of 
agreement by corporation. The District 
Court, Third District, Salt Lake County, 
Michael R. Murphy, J., granted corpora-
tion's motion for summary judgment. 
Sales representative appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that: (1) cor-
poration's improper attempt to make termi-
nation of agreement retroactive in violation 
of agreement did not invalidate termination 
itself but only affected timing of effective 
date of actual termination, and (2) sales 
representative was not entitled to receive 
from corporation any commissions in view 
of its settlement with subrepresentative for 
breach of subrepresentation agreement 
which expressly premised dollar amount of 
settlement on compensation under subre-
undisputed facts in the record to support its 
conclusion. The commission noted: (1) The 
medical records show no treatment for back 
pain after 1976; (2) The doctors who treated 
petitioner immediately after the accident noted 
he complained of pain and limited use of much 
of his body, "suggesting that the applicant was 
experiencing symptoms of progressive arthritis 
of the spine, shoulders, elbows, and hands;" (3) 
A doctor in 1976 concluded petitioner could 
return to work; and (4) A doctor evaluating 
petitioner for Social Security Benefits in 1981 
concluded petitioner's symptoms were out of 
proportion with the doctor's objective analysis 
APPENDIX "D" 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability—Amount of payments—Vocational 
rehabilitation—Procedure and payments.—In cases of permanent total dis-
ability the employee shall receive 66%% of his average weekly wages at 
the time of the injury, but not more thau a maximum of 85% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injur.v per week and not less 
than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and $5 for 
each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen }rears, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. 
However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or 
its insurance carrier be required to pay such weekly compensation pay-
ments for more than 312 weeks; and provided further, that a finding by 
the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative 
and not final until such time as the following proceedings have been had: 
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and 
totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of 
Utah refer such empio.vee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under 
the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the 
duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation 
division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1), not 
to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such em-
ployee; the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally 
follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-60, and relating to the 
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the 
division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education 
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah and in writing that such 
employee has fully co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilita-
tion in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division 
the employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order 
that there be paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66%% 
of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than 
a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 
for a dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor child under the 
age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of fourf such dependent minor 
children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the 
time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week out of that special fund provided 
for by section 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning with the 
time that the payments (as in this section provided) to be made by the 
employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of 
the employee. No employee, however, shall be entitled to any such benefits 
if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the division of vocational rehabili-
tation as set forth herein.-
Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally 
disabled and on that date or prior thereto were receiving compensation 
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) shall 
be paid compensation benefits at the rate of $60 per week. 
Commencing July 1,1975, all persons who were permanently and totally 
disabled on or before March 5, 1949, and were receiving compensation 
benefits and continue to receive such benefits shall be paid compensation 
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) at a rate 
sufficient to bring their weekly benefit to $60 when combined with employer 
or insurance carrier compensation payments. 
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of 
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commis-
sion of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon 
the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to 
be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such re-
habilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both 
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall 
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to 
the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total 
disability shall be required in such instances: m all i ther cases, however, 
and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some 
loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent 
disabilit}r. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to 
pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as pro-
vided in sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of 
function, in excess of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury per week for 312 weeks 
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ment of any artificial means or appliance for the rea-
son of breakage, wear and tear, deterioration, or obso-
lescence 
(5) The commission may, in unusual cases, order 
the payment of additional sums for burial expenses or 
to provide for artificial means or appliances as the 
commission considers just and proper 1994 
35-1-82,35-1-82.51. Repealed. 1965, 1987 
35-1-82.52. Appointment of law judges — Power 
and authority. 
(1) The commission shall appoint one or more ad-
ministrative law judges 
(2) The commission or any administrative law 
judge may call, preside at, and conduct hearings and 
adjudicative proceedings 
(3) (a) The commission and any administrative 
law judge may issue subpoenas 
(b) Failure to respond to a properly issued sub-
poena may result in a contempt citation and of-
fenders may be punished as provided in Section 
78-32-15 1987 
35-1-82.53. Review of administrative order — 
Finality of commission's order. 
(1) Any party m interest who is dissatisfied with 
the order entered by an administrative law judge 
may seek review of that order with the commission by 
complying with the commission's rules governing 
that review 
(2) The order of the commission on review is final, 
unless set aside by the Court of Appeals 1988 
35-1-82.54,35-1-82.55. Repea led . 1988 
35-1-82.56. Not ice to part ies of order or award. 
All parties in interest shall be given due notice of 
the entry of any administrative law judge's orde*- or 
any order or award of the commission The mailing of 
the copy of said order or award to the last known 
address shown in the files of the commission of any 
party in interest and to the attorneys or agents of 
record in the case, if any, shall be deemed to be notice 
of such order 1975 
35-1-83 to 35-1-85. Repea led . 1987 
35-1-85.1. Depos i t ions of w i t n e s s e s authorized. 
The commission or any party to a proceeding under 
this act may cause depositions of witnesses to be 
taken as m civil actions 1965 
35-1-86. Court of A p p e a l s m a y r e v i e w commis-
sion's actions. 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, 
reverse, or annul any order of the commission, or to 
suspend or delay the operation or execution of any 
order 1988 
35-1-87. At torneys ' fees . 
In all cases coming before the Industrial Commis-
sion m which attorneys have been employed, the com-
mission is vested with full power to regulate and fix 
the fees of such attorneys 1953 
35-1-88. Rules o f e v i d e n c e and procedure be-
fore commission and hearing examiner 
— Admissible evidence. 
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner 
shall be bound by the usual common-law or statutory 
rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal rules 
of procedure, other than as herein provided or as 
adopted by the commission pursuant to this act The 
commission may make its investigation in such man-
ner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain 
the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out 
justly the spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act 
The commission may receive as evidence and use as 
proof of any fact m dispute all evidence deemed mate-
rial and relevant including, but not limited to the 
following 
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented 
in open hearings 
(b) Reports of attending or- examining physi-
cians, or of pathologists. 
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the 
commission 
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of 
time sheets, book accounts or other records 
(e) Hospital records in the case of an injured or 
diseased employee 1965 
35-1-89. Injuries to minors. 
A minor shall be deemed sui juris for the purposes 
of this title, and no other person shall have any cause 
of action or nght to compensation for an injury to 
such minor workman, but in the event of the award of 
a lump sum of compensation to a minor employee, 
such sum shall be paid only to his legally appointed 
guardian 1953 
35-1-90. Void agreements b e t w e e n employers 
and employees . 
No agreement by an employee to waive his rights 
to compensation under this title shall be valid No 
agreement by an employee to pa> any portion of the 
premium paid by his employer shall be valid Any 
employer who deducts any portion of such premium 
from the wages or salary of any employee entitled to 
the benefits of this title is guilty of a misdemeanor, 
and shall be fined not more than $100 for each such 
offense 1953 
35-1-91. Phys ica l examinat ions . 
Any employee claiming the nght to receive com-
pensation under this title may be required by the 
commission, or its medical examiner, to submit him-
self for medical examination at any time, and from 
time to time, at a place reasonably convenient for 
such employee, and such as may be provided by the 
rules of the commission If such employee refuses to 
submit to any such examination, or obstructs the 
same, his right to have his claim for compensation 
considered, if his claim is pending before the commis-
sion, or to receive any payments for compensation 
theretofore granted, shall be suspended during the 
period of such refusal or obstruction 1953 
35-1-92. Autopsy in death c a s e s — Authority of 
commiss ion — Certified pathologist — 
Public record — Attending phys ic ians 
— Penal ty for refusal to permit — Lia-
bility. 
On the filing of a claim for compensation for death 
within the provisions of this act where, in the opinion 
of the commission it is necessary to accurately and 
scientifically ascertain the cause of death, an autopsy 
may be ordered by a majority of the commission and 
shall be made by a person designated by the commis-
sion The commission shall determine who shall pay 
the charge of the certified pathologist making the au-
topsy Any person interested may designate a duly 
licensed physician to attend such autopsy, and the 
findings of the certified pathologist performing the 
autopsy shall be filed with the commission and shall 
be a public record All proceedings for compensation 
shall be suspended upon refusal of a claimant or 
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(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of 
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings, 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25; 1990, 
ch. 132, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23,1990, added the excep-
tion at the end of Subsection (l)(a). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Final agency action. 
Function of district court. 
Right to judicial proceeding. 
Cited. 
Final agency action. 
Industrial Commission's determination of 
wrongful discharge was not final, and so not 
reviewable under this section, because the 
commission and the parties had not resolved 
the issue of reimbursement for lost wages and 
benefits as required by § 34-28-19(2). Parkdale 
Care Ctr. v. Frandsen, 837 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
Function of district court 
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final 
agency decisions through formal adjudicative 
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Su-
preme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, 
the district court will no longer function as in-
termediate appellate court except to review in-
formal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu-
ant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In re 
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, 
denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
The only appellate jurisdiction statutorily 
delegated to the district court is to review in-
formal agency adjudicative proceedings. State 
v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Right to judicial proceeding. 
District court erred in declining a de novo 
review of a dentist's claim to licensure by reci-
procity, where there had been no proceeding on 
his application that was sufficiently judicial in 
nature, and he had not yet had the licensing 
agency's action reviewed in a "trial-type hear-
ing." Kirk v. Division of Occupational & Pro-
fessional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance 
v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d 
233 (Utah 1992); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 52 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
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(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute, 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Jonflic 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26. 
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-
ings before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction 
and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Agency action 
Applicability of section. 
Arbitrary action. 
Conflicting evidence. 
Factual findings. 
Final order. 
Function of district court. 
Jurisdictional hearing by board. 
Prior practice. 
Review. 
Standard of review. 
—Interpretation of statutory term. 
—Questions of law. 
Substantial evidence test. 
Substantial prejudice. 
Whole record test. 
Cited. 
Agency action. 
Whether the Industrial Commission acted 
contrary to its own rule is governed by Subsec-
tion (4)(h)(ii) of this section Ashcroft v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct App 
1993). 
Applicability of section. 
Subsection (4) deals with judicial relief, not 
judicial review. It does not affect the degree of 
deference an appellate court grants to an 
agency's decision. Rather, it ensures that relief 
should not be granted when, although the 
agency committed error, the error was harm-
less. Morton Intl, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
Arbitrary action. 
Industrial commission's denial of occupa-
tional disease disability benefits based upon a 
solitary finding regarding the ultimate issue of 
causation failed to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions 
of mixed fact and law, were reached, and there-
fore rendered the action arbitrary. Adams > 
Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct App 
1991). 
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